Donations provided in support of the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy are tax deductible as a nonprofit gift under Harvard University’s IRS 501 (c) (3) status. Contributions should specify “for use only by the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy” in order to facilitate the required accounting procedures.

All views expressed in the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy are those of the authors or interviewees only and do not represent the views of Harvard University, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the staff of the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, the executive advisory board of the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy, or any associates of the journal.

© 2016 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College. All rights reserved. Except as otherwise specified, no article or portion herein is to be reproduced or adapted to other works without the expressed written consent of the editors of the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy.

Cover photo by Kristin A. Wagner.

ISSN: 2165-9117

Acknowledgments

The Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy would like to thank a number of individuals and institutions whose support proved invaluable to the production of this fifth edition. These include Martha Foley, publisher; Richard Parker, faculty advisor; and the HKS Journals Office, without whose patient guidance none of this would have been possible. Additionally, we would like to thank Hilary Rantisi, Krysten Hartman, Chris Mawhorter, and the entire Middle East Initiative staff for their generous contributions to the journal’s long-term sustainability and strategic vision; as well as the Wiener Center and all those who participated in this year’s editors’ workshops. We would especially like to thank our staff for its commitment, hard work, and attentiveness to detail, consistently demonstrated throughout the editing process.
Contents

1. Letter from the Editor
   By Kristin A. Wagner

INTERVIEWS
2. Iraq, Daesh, and Security
   Implications: Interview with
   Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament
   Salim al-Jabouri
   Interview conducted by Satgin Hamrah

3. Tunisia in Transition: An
   Exclusive Interview with Former
   Tunisian Minister of Economic
   Infrastructure and Sustainable
   Development Hedi Larbi
   Interview conducted by Kristin A. Wagner

ARTICLES
8. Two Strategies for Diffusing
   Tension in the Middle East
   By Benjamen Franklin Gussen

9. Caution Gives Way to
   Increasingly Assertive
   Policies in Saudi Arabia, But to
   What End?
   By Robert Mason

12. Looking to Syria: No-Fly-Zones
    and Political Stability in
    Iraq and Libya
    By Dylan MaGuire

18. Energy and Politics in the Eastern
    Mediterranean: Ramifications of
    Cypriot Peace Talks
    By Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu

23. Women in the Men's House:
    The Integration of Women in the
    Algerian Military
    By Dr. Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck

27. The Kurdish Divide: Reshaping
    of Interests and Actors in
    Syria's War
    By Joseph Sadek

32. Radicalization in Context:
    Understanding and Addressing
    the Path Toward Violent Extremism
    By Lauren Fisher

37. Against Apartheid: The Case for
    Boycotting Israeli Universities
    Book Review
    By Adi Saleem Bharat

REVIEWS
42. Tunisia's relative
    analyzes the no-fly zone
    option in Syria, with a look back to previous oper-
    ations in Iraq and Libya. Focusing on gender, Dr.
    Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck looks at integration and
    inclusion of women in Algeria’s military, yet pres-
ents a critique on its superficiality. With an eye
on Turkey’s destabilized southern border region,
Joseph Sadek provides commentary on the polit-
ical and geostrategic jostling between Turkey and
its Kurdish population, as well as the complex rela-
tionships between Turkey, the PKK, and Syrian
People’s Protection Units (YPG) rebels. Turning
to terrorism, Lauren Fisher presents an argument
against the stovepipe methodology of countering
violent extremism by exploring the complexities
behind the topic. Finally, we conclude with a litera-
ture review by Adi Saleem Bharat on the Boycott,
Divest, Sanction (BDS) movement as it pertains to
academia.

With the increasing growing list of challenges
faced by the Middle East today, we at JMEPP
understand and embrace the opportunity to view
both geopolitical and policy hurdles from dynamic
perspectives. We invite you to read, comment, and
contribute in the coming weeks, months, and years.
Only through discussion, criticism, and focused
engagement will the international community be
able to counteract the forces pulling the region
apart, and we invite you to join the conversation.
If you like the content contained herein, please
subscribe to future editions through our website at

Kristin A. Wagner
Editor-in-Chief
Cambridge, MA, April 2016

Letter from the Editor
Iraq, Daesh, and Security Implications: Interview with Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament Salim al-Jabouri

Interviewed by Satgin Hamrah

JMEPP: What factors in Iraq’s modern history do you think led to the creation of Daesh?

AL-JABOURI: Policies of oppression, discrimination, partisanship, the sectarian interests of the ruling elite, and the gross negligence of the demands of important parts of the Iraqi people are among the main factors that helped facilitate the creation and growth of Daesh, and provided the permissive environment to promote it. Some international players have also facilitated and helped in exporting Daesh, such as Iran. Religious extremism is not part of the Iraqi culture, but the continuous support for such ideas through media and social media have led to the polarization of some of the young and fervent people who have found themselves in this aforementioned environment.

JMEPP: Who or what are the contributing factors that are leading to Daesh losing territory?

AL-JABOURI: Daesh is suffering from internal problems. These problems stem from the fact that some of the Daesh members are ex-Ba’athists—remnants of the previous regime’s intelligence apparatus—as well as opportunistic fighters. The differences in approach definitely lead to such internal problems. Daesh also has become increasingly obsessed with financial gains, which, in turn, has become another source of internal tension, and as well as constituting a conflict of interest.

Another main factor that has led to the loss of Daesh territory is the participation of Sunnis in their respective territories. Another instrumental tool in this fight are the local fighters in the battle. This is in addition to the obstacles associated with security (and) the required logistical needs, i.e., weapons, training, information, and aid. Furthermore, it is important to use the concept “hold on” to the newly liberated territories as one of the main tools in this fight. Daesh is still capable of regaining territories if we don’t utilize the potential of the local people themselves in maintaining control of their respective territories. Another important factor in providing the manpower for this fight could be the recruitment of internally displaced peoples (IDPs) within Iraq. Daesh knows that those who have been expelled and suffered a great deal from being IDPs will fight and fiercely defend their land against future incursions into their territories.

JMEPP: How is Daesh being used as a tool to advance foreign interests?

AL-JABOURI: Daesh is a militarized organization that is based on an idea and interest. When Policies of oppression, discrimination, partisanship, the sectarian interests of the ruling elite, and the gross negligence of the demands of important parts of the Iraqi people are among the main factors that helped facilitate the creation and growth of Daesh, its interests match with the interests of some other countries, then Daesh and these countries will not hesitate to strike a deal to fulfill these interests with mutual help. In addition, some of these countries have been determined to be sending some of their intelligence members as fighters with Daesh and they might already have reached senior positions in this terrorist organization.

JMEPP: What were some of the lessons learned in recapturing Ramadi and the other areas that have been liberated from Daesh?

I fear that even a decade from now, we will be financially incapable of rebuilding the areas destroyed in the conflict, not to mention affording areas not touched by the conflict the opportunity to develop.

AL-JABOURI: One of the most important lessons we have learned from the liberation of Ramadi is the importance of depending on the tribes to liberate their own areas, and the importance of effective cooperation between them and the Iraqi army. This model has proven to be successful and has achieved major results. Thus, we call for repeating the same model in Nineveh (Mosul) and in liberating the rest of Salahaddin areas, which have not yet been liberated. In the same regard, it is important to include the local people, who may otherwise feel ashamed when they are prevented from participating in the liberation battles. The local people request the honor of participating in the liberation effort and look forward to avenging.

JMEPP: How do you think violence can be stemmed?

AL-JABOURI: Violence happens for various reasons. Two of the main reasons are the feelings of despair and oppression. I think one of the tools necessary to eliminate violence and extremism is to unite our efforts to achieve social justice and political reform. This is not to forget the important and critical role the media plays in society, raising the awareness about the danger and wrongdoing of ISIS.

JMEPP: How will Iraq be governed after Daesh is completely eliminated?

AL-JABOURI: It will be imperative for the Iraqi government to achieve the principle of decentralization as one of the most important tools that helps in getting rid of authoritarianism by affording societies and communities the opportunity to govern themselves. A post-Daesh Iraq will yield a key lesson for our people about the necessity of standing against extremist ideas. I expect that the areas that will be liberated will have a huge opportunity to develop and progress, and will consequently be immune to the return of terrorism. For the question of partitioning Iraq, I rule that option out and stand firmly against it. However, there will need to be a definite decentralization in the next phase of Iraq’s history. As previously mentioned, I don’t rule out that some of the governorates will request regional status, and I don’t see a problem with such requests, as long as they are within the constitutional limits and within the governorate framework as opposed to rooted in sectarianism.

JMEPP: What are some of the challenges associated with the rebuilding of Iraq and its administration?

AL-JABOURI: One of the principal challenges is the economic hardship that Iraq is facing. I fear that even a decade from now, we will be financially incapable of rebuilding the areas destroyed in the conflict, not to mention affording areas not touched by the conflict the opportunity to develop. However, we rely on international support, as well as seizing the opportunity of a reconstruction process that is based on international investment. This process will primarily depend on the government’s flexibility in its investment regulations and procedures, in addition to the extent of its efforts to convince international companies of the bene-
fits of investing. We are also awaiting the World Bank’s direct support to the local governments in their respective efforts to rebuild their areas by providing grants and loans. We consider this to be one of the most effective tools to expedite the reconstruction effort. We also cannot neglect the crucial impact of the security situation on the process of reconstruction. Without a permissive and stable security situation it will be difficult for any international player to enter the area, to initiate a reconstruction process, or to invest.

JMEPP: What challenges do you see in recruiting, expanding, and strengthening the Iraqi military?

AL-JABOUI: The biggest challenge is certainly political, as some parties would like to see the army represented by only one faction of Iraqi society. This is detrimental for the army and for the Iraqi people. The second challenge is the lack of a relationship between the people and the army in some areas. It is crucial that people feel that the security apparatus is there to serve them, not to suppress them. Only then will they be cooperative and the mission will certainly succeed. In addition to these factors, the economic challenges hinder the expansion and development of the army. For example, the current budget for the Ministry of Defense and Interior does not represent a war budget. It is limited and small.

JMEPP: Do you think tribal loyalties have an adverse impact on the Iraqi military?

AL-JABOUI: In general, tribal loyalties do not conflict with, or stand against, military doctrine and performance. Actually, it is sectarian loyalties that have affected the military institution, and I think the experience of including the tribes in the fights and battles proved how developed the tribes’ vision and the relation with the state are. The tribes no longer stand against government authority or the rule of law. There remains limited tribal unrest in Basra, which has affected the security apparatus.

Satgin Hamrah has a master of international relations from Boston University and a master of public administration from the University of Southern California. Satgin is a PhD student in history at Tufts University. She is also a PhD Fellow at the Fares Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies, a fellow at the South Asia Democratic Forum, an editor-at-large at E-International Relations, and an associate editor for Harvard University’s Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy.

Dr. Salim Al-Jabouri was elected as the speaker of the Iraqi Parliament on 15 July 2014. He holds a doctorate in law and previously worked as a law professor at Nahraun University in Baghdad. In this interview he answers questions about ISIS and the challenges associated with the rebuilding of Iraq and its military.

JMEPP: Thank you for meeting with us. Your Excellency Larbi. Many outsiders have commended Tunisia for what is described as a successful transition to democracy, post-revolution. Is this an accurate claim, to say that Tunisia has been the most successful of the countries that have faced unrest in the region? In what capacity can Tunisia be a role model for its neighbors?

LARBI: It’s difficult to say that Tunisia is a model, because, scientifically, a model is something that is replicable and for which you have definite analysis to measure definitive elements of it. That said, using the indicators of peacefully going through a process of political transformation and eventually obtaining institutions that are progressive in entrenching democratic regimes, as well as hosting free and democratic elections, it can be said that any type of transition, as measured by these metrics, is successful. Tunisia is a good example that can inspire the rest of the [MENA] region. Tunisia is an example of a transformation where varied political actors unite and agree on a transitional process. By striving for agreement through dialogue and consensus building, we can avoid what is happening in most of the countries in the region.

JMEPP: How would you characterize the state of the Tunisian economy and its development since the revolution, and what actual impact have political and security issues had on the economy?

LARBI: The political transition process has been tumultuous, and regrettably, the economic and social dimensions have been overlooked; hence, the economic situation is difficult, particularly when examining public finance balances, external accounts, economic growth, and unemployment rates. I don’t think that we can find an example of a transition where there were not major costs of this nature; the problem for Tunisia and the rest of the Arab world is that the transition took longer than it should have. We must work on ameliorating economic and social issues inherited from the past and exacerbated and aggravated during this transition.

JMEPP: What have been the consequences of the security issues Tunisia has faced in the past year, such as the attacks in Sousse and at the Bardo?

LARBI: The security issues are not only issues for Tunisia, but also issues for the region. Just after the Arab uprising, this relatively unknown “wild card” appeared very quickly; political Islam and radical groups wanted to have a role to play in politics. Unfortunately, this went far in terms of disturbing the security arrangements in these countries, and today, insecurity is a serious problem for the whole region, and even moving across borders to Europe and beyond. The consequences are in the form of negative impacts on the tourism sector, which is especially important for Tunisia, constituting seven to eight percent of the GDP. Similarly, they are also in the form of raising the risk profile for potential investors.

JMEPP: Have you seen an actual drop in FDI and investor confidence?

LARBI: There is currently some movement in addressing investment and economic issues in the country. In addition to the security issues, we also have to implement structural and fiscal reforms to create the business environment that is expected by investors and which inspire hope in the public. The political regime is equally as important as the economic regime, which includes a development model and the new approach to governance in Tunisia via transparency and accountability, as well as eliminating rigidity and bureaucracy in the system.

JMEPP: Are the interior regions of Tunisia indeed marginalized, as some Tunisians claim, and if so, to what extent is this a direct result of an imbalance in the government budget allocation?

Tunisia in Transition: An Exclusive Interview with Former Tunisian Minister of Economic Infrastructure and Sustainable Development Hedi Larbi

Interviewed by Kristin A. Wagner
LARBI: This is one of the issues that people think contributed to the uprising. Again, taking economic and social indicators into account, it's true that these regions, which are approximately 200 miles from the coast, are lagging behind in terms of having much higher unemployment, poverty, and less access. Perhaps they didn’t get the budget allocation they needed, but when I look at the issue, I find that they got almost equal the amount as any of Tunisia’s other regions, and sometimes even higher in terms of public allocation in investments. The problem lies in that public investment didn’t take place in these regions to the extent it should have. [We need the right diagnosis to have the right policies for this. We should revisit the business environment in this region and why this didn’t improve as it did in the coastal areas. This is attributed to two factors—the first is institutional. If you consider the local and regional institutions, they are extremely poor in terms of decision-making capacity. Tunisia is a highly centralized country and hence the decision-making process has not been developed at local and regional levels. Therefore, when investors go there, they go to identify their project and talk to the various authorities, but then they have to come back to the capital, Tunis, to make and execute these decisions [and] receive the proper authorization and deal with the bureaucracy that comes with it. Therefore, we don’t need to wait until we have a decentralization policy; we can now begin devolving some of the authority for decision-making to the regional level. The second key is to simplify the different procedures and bureaucracy at the regional level so the investor can be more motivated and afforded incentives. The incentives that are there should suffice if they are delivered in a timely and proper manner.

LARBI: Why didn’t the justice system address this issue since it was identified at least three years ago? This brings to light the real issue, which is the low functional capacity of our institutions, including the justice system. For those who embezzled public money and who are corrupt, the justice system should be permitted to deal with them accordingly. Whatever needs to be addressed should be addressed through the law. In terms of how it will impact the Tunisian economy if it is passed, I don’t know the specific amounts being discussed, but overall, we need to do serious reforms so as to inspire major investments. Unless we conduct sufficient reforms and reform the public sector, dealing with the bureaucratic procedures impeding investment in Tunisia [and] attaining the investment Tunisia needs will be a challenge.

JMEPP: What do you see as the role of international monetary institutions—some of which for whom you worked, such as the IMF and the World Bank—in promoting or hindering a democratic transition? How do you feel their policies toward, and expectations of, Tunisia have changed since Ben Ali, or have they?

LARBI: The international institutions do play a role and have tried to help Tunisia as much as possible in the process. Particularly responsible of them was the IMF and the World Bank—in promoting or hindering a democratic transition? How do you feel their policies toward, and expectations of, Tunisia have changed since Ben Ali, or have they? This brings to light the real issue, which is the low functional capacity of our institutions, including the justice system. For those who embezzled public money and who are corrupt, the justice system should be permitted to deal with them accordingly.

In terms of changing their policies, they definitely learned their lesson and have since attached much greater importance to good governance, transparency, fighting corruption, and attempting to implement institutional reforms. They’re also focused on inclusive growth, equity, redistribution, and creating the jobs that Tunisians need, while being cognizant of the necessity of helping Tunisian institutions embed and tailor policy suggestions to the Tunisian context, as opposed to taking them as external recommendations that are imposed.

Kristin A. Wagner is a master of international business candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and editor-in-chief of the Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy.

Hedi Larbi served as both the Minister of Economic Infrastructure and Sustainable Development and the Economic Advisor to the Prime Minister, Tunisia, between 2014 and 2015. Larbi has over thirty-five years of professional experience in economic and social development as both a policy advisor and policy maker, with more than two decades of high level work in the World Bank group, the private sector, and the Tunisian transitional government.
Two Strategies for Diffusing Tension in the Middle East

By Benjamen Franklen Gussen

Abstract
This paper argues that the Middle East as an analytical or geopolitical concept has become too problematic. The prophylactic measures proposed here center on two strategies. The first is the dissolution of the Middle East based on differentiated continental association. This would see Turkey and Iran become part of Europe and Asia, respectively, while the rest of the Middle East—including Israel—would become part of a “Greater Africa.” The redissolution would ensure the accentuation of the differences between different parts of the Middle East, to the end of reducing tension between them. The second strategy is based on polycentrism. The paper argues for greater emphasis on polycentric constitutional orders in the spirit of philosopher Baruch Spinoza’s understanding of sovereignty. This vision necessitates international treaties to underwrite charter cities as the dominant governance structure in the Middle East. Sovereignty, as envisaged by Spinoza, is the key proposition for polycentric governance structures, given this sovereignty’s subsidiarity between different organizational scales (local, national, and global). The Middle East is made up of a rich mosaic of religions and ethnicities that is especially amenable to such orders. A lasting peace in the Middle East requires relinquishing the nation-state model in favor of small, non-contiguous jurisdictions connected in loose confederal structures within the cultural milieu of different continents. Syria and Iraq are ideal for implementing this new subsidiarity approach.

The Tension Induced by the Middle East Mosaic
Demographically, the Middle East is one of the richest regions in the world. This cradle of civilization continues to be home to ethnicities as diverse as Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, Circassians, Copts, Druze, Jews, Persians, Kurds, Maronites, Somalis, Turks, and other denominations from less numerically significant minorities. The region is also home to many religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and smaller faiths such as the Bahá’í Faith, Druze, Yazidiism, and Zoroastrianism. However, this beautiful diversity—the signifier of a rich mosaic of cultures, religions, and ethnicities, as Arabs, Armenians, Assyrians, Azeris, Circassians, Copts, Druze, Jews, Persians, Kurds, Maronites, Somalis, Turks, and other denominations from less numerically significant minorities. The region is also home to many religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, and smaller faiths such as the Bahá’í Faith, Druze, Yazidiism, and Zoroastrianism. However, this beautiful diversity—the signifier of a rich mosaic of cultures, religions, and ethnicities, as well as its sovereignty. Such non-contiguous states are at the center of Spinozistic discourse. Spinoza provides a model in which powers are shared between sovereign bodies . . . which reaffirm their separateness . . . in federal systems such as the United States or in Australia, legislative, judicial and executive powers are distributed between federal and different state governments . . . under [Spinozistic sovereignty], however, “confederal” powers . . . were extremely closely restricted . . . Rather than attempting to harmonize differences . . . [it upholds] the constructiveness of difference . . .

City power is again on the ascendency, as we can currently discern a move toward empowering cities on two fronts. The first front is domestic where there is constitutional recognition of co-operative models of federalism, of the local governments of city-regions as co-equal to federal and state governments, and the development of what is known as the “doctrine of usurpation of jurisdiction.” This approach does not emphasize political autonomy, but rather the idea of subsidiarity where general competence powers are extended to city-regions.

The second front is international, where there is an emerging field of law that acknowledges city-regions as independent international actors. While international law has long had an indirect impact on cities, it is now enlarging the nation state club that has historically dominated its institutions in order to admit subnational governance structures,
most notably city-regions, mainly through regul-
ating the relationship between cities and their na-
ton states. International instruments such as the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Inter-
national Convention on Economic, Social, and Cul-
rural Rights (ICESCR), among others, are altering the relationship between cities and nation states. City-regions are becoming "nodal points for rad-
ially distinct governance projects that have their com-
mon goal to transform cities from mere sub-
visions of sovereign states into legally empowered en-
tities, able to advance goals and values that are dif-
fierent from their states."

Given its rich cultural mosaic, the Middle East is a prime candidate for empowering cities as polities. To be precise, countries like Syria and Iraq, inter-
alia, would be best constituted as confederations of charter cities. For example, in Syria, the largest

“A lasting peace in the Middle East requires relinquishing the nation-state model in favor of small, non-contiguous jurisdictions connected in loose confederal structures within the cultural milieu of different continents.

cities (Aleppo, Damascus, Homs, Latakia, Hama, Ar-Raqqa, Deir ez-Zor, Al-Hassakah, Qamishli, and Sayyidah Zaynab) would be reconstituted as
confederations of charter cities. For example, in Syria, the largest

Endnotes
1. See Faddal A. Jabat, Tribes and Power: Nationalism and Ethnicity in the Middle East (London: Saqi Books, 2002) and
2. See Gerard Russell, Heirs to Forgotten Kingdoms: Journeys into the Disappearing Religions of the Middle East (New
5. For an example, see M. A. Cook, Muhammed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).
12. Prokhovnik, Sovereignties, 228.
Caution Gives Way to Increasingly Assertive Policies in Saudi Arabia, But to What End?

By Robert Mason

Abstract
Since King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud assumed the Saudi Arabian throne on 23 January 2015, there have been clear continuities in both Saudi domestic and foreign policies to maintain regime security and stability for the ruling elite; however, significant change is also evident on a number of levels. This paper attempts to reflect differences in leadership styles of the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud and King Salman, dynamics within the royal family, and state relations with the U.S. (recognized Islamic scholars and authorities) and the broader population. The onset and consequences of the Arab Spring have raised questions about the legitimacy of the Al Saud family rule, which are being met by the Saudi government with a steadfast neutralization and counter policy. This article will focus on the issue of succession in Saudi leadership, the Saudi military’s involvement in the current war in Yemen, the Saudi role in the new Sunni-dominated military alliance, and the execution of Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr. Finally, the article will analyze whether a more assertive policy stance will support the Al Saud regime or ultimately undermine its stability.

Succession in Saudi Leadership
As Rob Sobhani discusses in King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia: A Leader of Consequence, the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 2005 until his death in 2015, was considered by his supporters to be a reformist and by the United States as a close ally and someone who brought stability to the kingdom. He focused on increasing access to Saudi education through 200,000 scholarships that enable Saudis (of both sexes) to study at foreign universities or to study at the growing number of universities across the kingdom. He additionally spent considerable effort improving the status of women in Saudi society, granting women the right to vote for the first time in 2015. He addressed extremism and issues surrounding religion and the economy and oil, seeking to make advances within a conservative rubric.

A Shift in Policy
Similarly, since the succession of Abdullah’s half-brother, King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, to the throne following King Abdullah’s death in January 2015, King Salman has been labeled “focused,” “assertive,” and “austere” by Khaled Almacefa, editor-in-chief of Arab News, a mainstream Arab news agency. Furthermore, CNN agrees that King Salman is viewed as “a pragmatic and cautious reformer.” These features are particularly relevant in an oil-rich state where various royal families have been involved in money-making schemes, and where, as early as 1986, the US government was concerned about a backlash against them. Resistance over economic disparities still exists and has become part of a range of economic challenges linked to the Arab Spring (such as jobs, economic diversification, and development), social marginalization, sectarianism, terrorism. However, traditional caution of King Salman and the Al Saud rulers before him appears to have given way in the advent of the Syrian conflict in 2011 to more assertive foreign policies in an effort to address an increasingly insecure and unstable Gulf region and wider Middle East. In the first weeks of his tenure as king, Salman issued decrees that promoted Prince Mohammad bin Nayef to Deputy Crown Prince and Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Minister of Defense. In similar fashion, he promoted individuals from his own Sudairi branch of the royal family to higher rankings within the government. The risk of the unprecedented move to promote Prince Mohammad bin Salman to Ministry of Defense is that he lacks relative experience and could therefore compromise the external security of the kingdom.

King Salman’s son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, thirty-four, had not held a government posting prior to assuming the high-profile position of Minister of Defense. In addition, he is widely viewed as a driving force behind the Saudi intervention in Yemen, garnering accusations from the Bundensachverständigenamt (Germany’s intelligence agency, BND) of destabilizing the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region through a policy that prioritizes regional leadership and utilizes a strong military component. Therefore, King Salman’s personnel decisions have resulted in controversy surrounding Saudi policies.

Problems Within Saudi Leadership Circles
Saudi Arabia’s controversial military campaign in Yemen has forced Saudi leadership into a tight position in which it cannot afford to make policy missteps. Yemen’s civil war has become regionalized, involving other member countries of the Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC), such as Qatar and the UAE, as well as the use of foreign mercenaries from states as far away as Colombia. If the ground offensive objectives in Yemen are not realized, Prince Mohammad bin Salman may become marginalized from the defense portfolio. This could happen through a number of possible scenarios, including a prolonged Saudi military campaign without resolution or further condemnation from the US or the UN for alleged breaches of human rights and international law. The precedent for such ostracism already exists; Prince Bandar bin Sultan was relieved from his two positions as secretary-general of the now defunct National Security Council and as special envoy of the king with responsibility for Syria policy due to the contribution of his decisions. Resentment over economic disparities still exists and has become part of a range of economic challenges linked to the Arab Spring (such as jobs, economic diversification, and development), social marginalization, sectarianism and terrorism.

to growing tensions with the US.

In this case, it is clear how Prince Mohammad bin Nayef’s profile and popularity, at age fifty-five, would be elevated. His role as Minister of the Interior since his father, former Crown Prince Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, passed away in 2012 demonstrates his high standing within the Saudi family. Importantly, US officials have positively viewed Prince Mohammad bin Nayef, specifically during an enhanced period of US–Saudi counter-terrorism cooperation that took place when he oversaw his country’s campaign against Al-Qaeda in the mid-to-late 2000s. He is therefore more experienced and is well placed to deal with any significant spillover effects from the Yemen conflict, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which is using its growing base in Yemen to once again challenge the Saudi state.

The Influence of Yemen’s Civil War on Saudi Foreign Policy
Given the high stakes in Yemen, it is surprising that Saudi Arabia has consented to UN-backed peace talks. Nevertheless, Riyadh knows that the US is supportive of its conflict against the Houthis, with which the Saudis perceive an Iranian-backed insurgency. It will consequently take time for any potential UN resolution to be approved and implemented. However, there are signs that growing civilian casualties in the conflict are drawing in greater US participation in vetting military targets and searching vessels bound for Yemen. Time is an important factor in this calculation because in the interim period, Saudi forces can try to implement changes on the ground and better shape the outcomes to benefit Saudi Arabia. Thus, while talks are unlikely to succeed until Saudi Arabia has secured a military advantage on the battlefield, continued fighting on both sides has compromised the negotiation timeline. July and December 2015. The death of the head of the Saudi Special Forces, Colonel Abdullah al-Sayhan, who was killed in December 2015 in Taiz province, has only contributed to the sense that the war must go on until Saudi Arabia has demonstrated its ability to impose its will in Yemen and vis-à-vis Iran by defeating the Houthis. Riyadh continues to insist that Iran is the destabilizing power in the region through its support of “insurgencies” in Bahrain, as well as in Yemen, where Iran is said to support the Shiite Houthi rebels. The notion that Iran was an integral part of Saudi Arabia’s Yemen intervention was personally delivered by King Salman to President Obama during their September 2015 meeting in Washington D.C. The clear and direct conversation demonstrates the extent to which the Saudis are trying to keep the Obama administration on board. This has become all the more necessary as the Saudi-led Yemen conflict has been described as “traumatizing to its [Yemen’s] civilian population.” Western support has since come under more intense pressure after the UN stated in January 2016 that the use of indiscriminate cluster munitions “may amount to a war crime.” Thus, another Saudi lobbying effort was underway, targeting the European parliament in February 2016, just before the European Union (EU) implemented an
arms embargo on Saudi Arabia linked directly to the heavy civilian casualties due to its conduct in Yemen.

Additional Foreign Policy Issues
Saudi Arabia has, for decades, maintained a policy of limiting Shi'ite influence and expanding its own Sunni influence through the heavy funding of mosques and madrassas (Islamic religious schools), Islamic associations, and training centers across the Islamic and developing world, as well as in states of strategic interest, including China. Such foreign policy forays are increasingly drawing criticism from Europe, which is claiming that such programs may fund jihadi causes. Additionally, these efforts have exacted a heavy financial burden on Saudi Arabia. Conventional military expansion alone amounted to $100 billion over the last five years, and will amount to another $30 billion over the next two years. The cumulative outlay is contributing to increasing financial pressure, which has been further exacerbated by $30 billion of government largesse to the Sunni-dominated population distributed during 2012 and which lasted until the oil price collapse in 2015. A sustained low international oil price has forced the Saudi government to cut back on typical spending in order to save billions of dollars. Fiscal restraint has come late to the kingdom, but is necessary in order for the central bank to stop burning through financial reserves. In April 2015, central bank reserves dropped by $36 billion—the equivalent of 5 percent—in just two months, and foreign reserves fell by $16 billion in March 2015, further illustrating the kingdom’s decreasing wealth.

Saudi Domestic Policy
As governor of Riyadh for fifty years prior to his current appointment, King Salman transformed the cityscape from desert land into skyscrapers. As King, he presides over a period of continued and rapid growth in infrastructure projects, despite the financial difficulties that the kingdom has recently incurred. Kingdom Tower, owned by Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal, already dominates the skyline in Riyadh, and other Saudi cities are emulating their own grand infrastructure projects. In Jeddah, Saudi Arabia’s commercial center, Jeddah Tower is set to mark a new record as the world’s tallest building in 2018, and, in conjunction with the Kingdom City project in Riyadh, cost $20 billion to build. In Mecca, the holiest city for Muslims, Saudi authorities started building a $7.2 billion mega-hotel with five helipads and five floors specifically for use by Saudi royalty, along with 10,000 rooms, in 2015. However, such rapid development has not come without costs. For example, the estimated death toll of 2,411 from the Hajj stampede in Mecca in September 2015 called into question the competency of the Saudi government as the authority of the “ Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques.” Furthermore, Saudi Arabia has continued to struggle, similar to other GCC states, with migrant labor issues created by a growing economy exacerbating the kafala system of sponsorship (which makes migrants dependent on employers and can be open to abuse) and the mass expulsions that took place in 2013 and 2015. The costuming to military intervention where subsequent austerity could play into the hands of violent Islamists as the social and economic gap between the elite and the marginalized section of the population widens.

A New Sunni Military Alliance
Apart from efforts to unite the country on the Yemen campaign by improving relations with the Muslim Brotherhood, Saudi Arabia has focused on addressing the growing violent threats in the Islamic world. It is tackling this issue foremost through a new Sunni military alliance consisting primarily of existing allies across the Islamic world, with a joint operations center in Riyadh. Additionally, the Saudis have begun publicly voicing their willingness to send in ground troops (likely special forces) to Syria as part of a US-led coalition to help combat the Islamic State. These steps serve multiple purposes, including:
• Addressing international concerns that Saudi Arabia is not making sufficient efforts to tackle the so-called Islamic State that the Paris attacks era to degrade and destroy it;
• Confronting those who accuse Saudi Arabia of promoting violent Islam through its promotion of Wahhabism, a radical, exclusionist, and puritanical branch of Sunni Islam;
• Tackling national concerns that the Islamic State (and other violent Islamic factions) pose a growing threat to the kingdom;
• Drawing states from Africa, Asia, and the Middle East into a closer orbit with Saudi Arabia and therefore influencing them in accordance with Saudi policies vis-à-vis Iran; and
• Demonstrating a continued commitment to US objectives (particularly important in the context of remarks made by President Obama in March 2016 in which he labeled Saudi Arabia, along with some others in the gul en and in Europe, as “free riders”) and encouraging Washington to lead a more effective coalition in areas that are deemed vital to Saudi national security interests.

Despite these efforts, there are a number of troubling features inherent to the new Sunni military alliance. First, certain members such as Pakistan have expressed surprise at their inclusion in the alliance without prior consultation. A Pakistani army spokesman confirmed that “we are not looking for any involvement outside our region.” Second, activities of the alliance will include everything from efforts in counter-terrorism ideology and terrorism between 2013 and 2015. The costuming to military intervention where it is deemed necessary (mandated by the UN or the Arab League). The new Saudi-led coalition could thus be considered too broad in scope, challenging in particular al-Nimr’s memory of the political will of others to be truly effective. The likelihood of the coalition reverting back to a unified military command in the style of the GCC could therefore be quite high. Third, by focusing exclusively on the Houthis in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has demonstrated that a broader intervention targeting terror groups such as AQAP is not currently on the agenda, to the point where the Saudi-led coalition continuously avoids attacking AQAP positions. This has resulted in substantial territorial gains for AQAP in Yemen, whereas just over a decade ago the Saudi interior ministry was fighting a counter-terrorism campaign against AQAP on the streets of Riyadh.

The Execution of Nimr al-Nimr
Domestically, Riyadh perceives the Muslim Brotherhood, Syrian jihadists, and human rights activists as active threats to national security. A case that exemplifies this challenge is the trial of Raif Badawi, a blogger who was sentenced in June 2015 to 1,000 lashes for criticizing Saudi Arabia’s religious police, which the authorities equated with blasphemy. His sentencing received harsh criticism from Europe and he subsequently received the 2015 Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.

The execution of senior Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr is further evidence of the Saudi struggle for control of its internal affairs, and in particular the restive Eastern province—especially in Qatif where al-Nimr was a driving force behind violent protests that broke out in 2011, and where he called for secession and the formation of a Shi'ite state. Al-Nimr was also renowned for his hostile, anti-government speeches, which began in 2002, and indirectly caused police casualties.

Al-Nimr’s Execution: A Ripple Effect
Instead, the Saudi political calculations behind al-Nimr’s execution seek to avoid domestic attention on what Bruce Riedel, a former CIA officer, calls a “perfect storm” of “low oil income, open-ended war in Yemen, terrorist threats from multiple directions, and an intensifying regional rivalry with its nemesis, Iran.” In private, several US officials have been more forthcoming about expressing their anger over the poor timing of the Nimr execution, as it risks undermining US policy in the wider region. Specifically, the actions have complicated efforts, through rising sectarian confrontation and proxy conflict for a peaceful resolution in both Yemen and Syria, which requires both Iranian and Saudi diplomatic support. Exacerbation of Sunni–Shia Tensions
Rather than enhancing cooperation, al-Nimr’s execution has escalated Saudi Arabian tensions with Iran. These tensions were further exacerbated by the Iranian authorities’ unwillingness to stop the Sunni insurgency in Tehran from being stormed by Iranian protestors in the immediate aftermath of the execution in January 2016. Adding to the hostility, Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, said on 2 January 2016 that “Saudi will not pass this test.” In private, several US officials have been more forthcoming about expressing their anger over the poor timing of the Nimr execution, as it risks undermining US policy in the wider region. Specifically, the actions have complicated efforts, through rising sectarian confrontation and proxy conflict for a peaceful resolution in both Yemen and Syria, which requires both Iranian and Saudi diplomatic support. Exacerbation of Sunni–Shia Tensions
Rather than enhancing cooperation, al-Nimr’s execution has escalated Saudi Arabian tensions with Iran. These tensions were further exacerbated by the Iranian authorities’ unwillingness to stop the Sunni insurgency in Tehran from being stormed by Iranian protestors in the immediate aftermath of the execution in January 2016. Adding to the hostility, Ali Larijani, the speaker of Iran’s parliament, said on 2 January 2016 that “Saudi will not pass this test.” In private, several US officials have been more forthcoming about expressing their anger over the poor timing of the Nimr execution, as it risks undermining US policy in the wider region. Specifically, the actions have complicated efforts, through rising sectarian confrontation and proxy conflict for a peaceful resolution in both Yemen and Syria, which requires both Iranian and Saudi diplomatic support.

The Middle East.
severed ties with Iran over its response to the ex-ecution. Former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki called the execution a “crime . . . [which] will topple the Saudi regime . . .”. The execution of Nimr al-Nimr reveals a much wider conflict taking place throughout the region, pitting Saudi Arabia against its Shiite rivals.

**Execution and Religious Interpretation**

The Saudi elite insist that the constitution of the kingdom rests on the Qur’an and Shari’a law, and that al-Bay’ah (a contract or pledge of allegiance), exists to ensure that the ruler act in accordance with the will of God and the people. Although the execution of Nimr al-Nimr was deemed to be in accordance with the Wahhabi interpretation of Shari’a law, Shari’a is a huge body of literature with four bodies of jurisprudence. The sentencing could therefore have been interpreted differently in Wahhabi tradition, with a greater emphasis on the broader interests of the ummah (the whole community of Muslims bound together by religious ties), such as reducing sectarian conflict, not only in the kingdom, but also across the region and the Islamic world.

**Conclusion**

The undercurrent of discontent in Saudi society among its citizenry—especially those who call for a written constitution, and particularly the Shi’a population—as well as factions within the royal family, pose a different but persistent threat to regime stability. These threats will be magnified if the current political policies such as escalating sectarian tensions with Iran, military policies such as engagement in Yemen, and economic policies such as austerity, diversification, and jobs, fail to achieve their objectives.

The changes in Saudi leadership and succession planning have raised the stakes for King Salman. His appointment of his relatively inexperienced son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman, from the third generation of princes when other experienced princes, such as Abdul Aziz bin Turki al-Faisal, who call for a written constitution, and particularly among its youth and reformists—especially those making, but also within an evolving global agenda set by Washington.

**Robert Mason** is lecturer in political science at the British University in Egypt. His work includes *International Politics of the Arab Spring: Popular Unrest and Foreign Policy (Palgrave, 2014) and Foreign Policy in Iran and Saudi Arabia: Economics and Diplomacy in the Middle East (I.B. Tauris, 2015).* He is a contributing author to a newly edited volume of Saudi Arabian Foreign Policy: Conflict and Cooperation (I.B. Tauris, 2016).

**Endnotes**

8. For more on the Al Saud Clan see: “Al Saud Clan or Saudia Seven,” Saudi US Relations Information Service, n.d. “The Al Saud in America,” the “Saudia Seven” (full brothers within the House of Saud), was established by Hessa bint Ahmed al-Saudi with King Abdulaziz, the founder of Saudi Arabia. The clan is from Najd, the same part of the Arabian Peninsula as the Al Saud. See Hussein Ibish, “Riyadh Reshuffle: Saudi Shake-up Consolidates King’s Power,” The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 30 April 2015.
10. Including hermeneutic status in the Gulf Cooperation Council and arms sales abroad as well as within its guardianship of the two holy places (Mecca and Medina), and through influences primarily through the Saudi Arabia’s “Detourising Arab World,” German Intelligence Warning,” The Economic Daily Post, 28 February 2015.
17. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. One of many discussions held at the official level on Saudi Arabia’s response to Iran in the advent of the U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement and regional turmoil. See Jonathan Baron, “The Lesser of the Cold War Between Iran and Saudi Arabia May Be Obama,” Newsweek, 1 January 2016.
38. “Saudi Arabia Sends Colombian Mercenaries to Yemen to Send Ground Troops to Syria to Fight ISIS,” AP Thomson, Reuters, 2 February 2016.
41. Baig, Syed Javid, “Pakistan’s Surprised by its Inclusion in 34-Nation Military Alliance,” Al Arabiya, 3 November 2015.
43. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
Looking to Syria: No-Fly-Zones and Political Stability in Iraq and Libya

By Dylan MaGuire

Abstract
The ongoing civil war in Syria has reignited interest in no-fly zones as policy options for halting violence against civilians and maintaining stability in conflict-ridden regions. In order to evaluate the success of this policy option, this article will survey a portion of relevant literature to establish the components of no-fly zone operations, followed by an examination of US-led Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq and United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions and presidential statements, as these best capture the strategic thinking at the time of implementation. Outcomes will be measured through an analysis of the security and political situations on the ground shortly after the cessation of operations. Though subject to interpretation, this metric provides estimates for the performance of the no-fly zones in question and insights as to their overall success. Finally, this piece will discuss the findings from the case study analysis and make brief policy recommendations for a no-fly zone in Syria.

Due to its infrequent use, the literature on no-fly zones remains limited but suggests a three-category typology, developed by Alexander Benard, for classifying operations (see Table 1). Type 1 features air assets providing air cover for ground troops deployed in combat or otherwise hostile environments; Type 2 presents air assets as the sole means of influencing the situation on the ground; and Type 3 employs air assets as a deterrent for creating a buffer space between combatants on the ground. All three types prioritize establishing air supremacy in the designated zone and also seek to collect intelligence to monitor developments on the ground. The discriminating factor between types is the amount of risk assumed by the military forces responsible for maintaining the zone. Yet, this typology remains weak when differentiating between desired political outcomes. While Types 1 and 2 could describe classic military operations between belligerent parties, only Type 3 specifically seeks to de-conflict and potentially create humanitarian safe zones, thus resembling the common understanding of the no-fly zone.

Conceptual Definitions
Many military analysts broadly define no-fly zones as the restriction of airspace to unauthorized aircraft. These analysts narrowly define success and fail to consider the responsibility to protect innocent life, but the use of limited military power produces potentially destabilizing outcomes that go beyond the capabilities of humanitarian relief operations. The proliferation of authoritarian regimes that rely on force to maintain order, coupled with policymakers searching for options to influence events, has led to the current demand for no-fly zones in Syria. The outcome of implementing no-fly zones as they pertain to political stability must be taken into account when measuring the efficacy of the approach.

Operation Provide Comfort: Northern Iraq, 1991 to 1996

In response to the Iraqi invasion and consequent occupation of Kuwait in 1990, a US-led coalition pushed the Iraqi government forces that were occupying Kuwait back into southern Iraq, leading to the 28 February 1991 ceasefire and ending Operation Desert Storm. The coalition quickly routed much of the regular Iraqi army. However, most of the praetorian Republican Guard had withdrawn in good order, leaving the regime with a diminished, albeit capable, military. Shortly before declaring the ceasefire, President H.W. Bush called on “the Iraqi military and the Iraqi people to take matters into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside.”

Kurdish and Shia rebellion soon broke out in the north and south of the country with fighting, producing civilian casualties and severe food shortages among populations deemed sympathetic to the rebels.

During formal negotiations with Iraq, General Norman Schwarzkopf, as the head of the coalition, granted Iraq permission to fly helicopters, but not fixed-wing aircrafts. This resulted in the Iraqi army using helicopters against the rebels. The US-led coalition strictly enforced its decision to ban Iraqi use of fixed-wing aircrafts, to which the regime largely complied. The Republican Guard instead relied on armored ground units, artillery, and helicopters in their campaign that ended in April 1991 with the defeat of the rebels. The defeat sparked fear among Kurdish civilians that the regime would make use of its chemical weapons stockpiles, as it had done in 1988 during the Iran–Iraq War. Soon thereafter, over two million Kurdish refugees were scattered across the mountainous border region between Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. On 5 April 1998, the UNSC acknowledged the

Table 1. Benard’s No-Fly Zone Typology

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Activity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Air Cover</td>
<td>Provide close air support and overwatch for ground troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Air Occupation</td>
<td>Exert force without deploying ground troops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(3) Air Deterrent</td>
<td>Create buffer zone between hostile groups</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Summary of Findings

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Case</th>
<th>Operational/Political Goal</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Operation Provide Comfort</td>
<td>Humanitarian relief, territorial integrity</td>
<td>Soft partition, civil war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Unified Protector</td>
<td>Civilian protection, national unity</td>
<td>Regime change, civil war</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the crisis and adopted Resolution 688 in response.

Operational and Political Goals

Under the authority provided by UNSC 688, President H.W. Bush ordered the start of Operation Provide Comfort, a military humanitarian relief effort and no-fly zone. The operation included ground elements and humanitarian relief on the Iraqi-Turkish border with a no-fly zone enforced against "Iraqi fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft flying north of the 36th parallel." The first phase of the operation saw a Type 1 no-fly zone, but with the withdrawal of ground troops in mid-July of that year, it shifted to a Type 2. When asked about US commitment towards the protected enclaves, President H.W. Bush responded that "I don't think it has to be long-term . . . and now this is a logical step to get it [humanitarian relief] done much more sanitarily . . . " While recognizing the plight of Iraqi-Kurdish refugees, President H.W. Bush made it clear that the United States did not wish "to see a fractured, destabilized Iraq," that the U.S. was not going to "interfere in its civil war," and that the "Iraqi people must decide their own political future." According to these stipulations, Operation Provide Comfort was a temporary solution to a humanitarian crisis and was not intended to lead to Iraq's fracture.

Outcome

Under coalition air cover, the Kurdish Democ ratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) formed the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and held their first elections in May 1992, after which they formed a unity government. During this process the US never officially recognized the KRG, a redline for its ally Turkey, but rather provided assistance for the elections. However, significant economic pressure from internally displaced Kurds, a lack of reliable funding, and former guerrilla fighters not accustomed to governing led to a breakdown in the unity government, negatively impacting any political progress that had been achieved up to that point.

In May 1994, less than two years after the election, internal divisions in the Kurdish coalition government erupted into open fighting; by June, casualties numbered in the hundreds. What eventually became known as the Kurdish Civil War saw both sides seek assistance from external sources with the PUK favoring Iran and the KDP looking to Baghdad for support. In early August 1996, the Iraqi army advanced north on the Kurdish capital despite meager US objections. One US official at the time remarked that "overall, the administration was positively disgusted with the Kurds." Operation Provide Comfort had successfully delivered much needed humanitarian relief but had also provided space for the rekindling of hostilities.

Operation Unified Protector: Libya, 2011

In February 2011, Libya in the city of Benghazi — inspired by public displays of dissatisfaction with authoritarian rule in neighboring states—held a "day of rage" demonstration that quickly spread to other eastern cities as regime control collapsed in the face of public protest. Armed opposition to the government was fueled in part by regional aff liation; many local Tulains cleaved to the Leni, and its supporters in the west against its traditional rivals in the east. Reports at the time indicated that government forces responded to the initial protests with live ammunition that killed Libyans and the world would be better off with Qadhafi out of power . . . but broadening our military mission to include regime change would be a mistake." The special envoy, the operation was authorized and implemented reveals that the US and its coalition partners believed a great loss of life was imminent and took action to prevent it. The political plans following the implementation of the no-fly zone were less well defined, and the Security Council Resolution did not specifically authorize regime change.

Outcome

Operation Unified Protector officially ended on October 31, just eleven days after opposition forces executed Colonel Qadhafi. President Obama expressed his congratulations, saying that a "dark shadow of tyranny has been lifted. With this promise, the Libyan people now have a great responsibility: to build an inclusive and tolerant democratic Libya. . . ." On 16 September 2011, the UNSC adopted Resolution 2011, which stated that "the international community . . . "looks forward to stability in Libya" and hopes to "ensure a consultative, inclusive political process with a view to agreement on a constitution and the holding of free and fair elections." The resolution also established the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to aid the newly empowered National Transition Council (NTC) in its efforts to restore order, undertake political dialogue, extend state authority, and promote human rights. Following the end of the operation and the announcement of the NTC as the official Libyan representative in the post-Qadhafi order, NATO ended the no-fly zone.

Despite the NTC holding nominal control of the government, on the ground the situation appeared far more fluid. Many of the anti-Qadhafi opposition groups now refused to disarm and demobilize. The NTC, lacking the requisite manpower, was in no position to force compliance from the diverse militias with which it had recently been allied. Several centers of power quickly developed within and outside of the NTC. In addition, Islamist militias that had been affiliated with the NTC began issuing demands and stockpiling arms. On 7 July 2012, elections were held for the General National Congress charged with appointing a Constituent Assembly to draw up Libya's new constitution. While this constituted a significant achievement, its success would prove to be short lived.

On 11 September 2012, mutinies under the guise of an anti-US protest outside the US consulate in Benghazi assailed the compound and killed US Ambassador Christopher Stevens and several of his colleagues. The US quickly pulled out all remaining military personnel and kept distant from its counterpart. At the time of this article's writing, Libya is roughly divided between two warring camps, each with external sponsors and both composed of an assortment of armed groups controlling territory. Operation Unified Protector had successfully averted the regime's efforts to put down the rebellion, but in doing so also significantly contributed to creating the conditions that allowed for the overthrowing of the Libyan government.

Findings

The use of no-fly zones as a policy for providing immediate humanitarian relief and civilian protection is strongly supported in the aforementioned data. Operation Provide Comfort and Operation Unified Protector identified imminent humanitarian catastrophes and were able to successfully avert them. Short-term goals articulated by the authorizing documents and statements made by Presidents H.W. Bush and Barack Obama were clear, concise, and met without difficulty. However, the data does not support the successful achieve ment of long-term political stability (see Table 2). In fact, the data reveals the exact opposite of the stated policy preference for the maintenance of territorial integrity and national unity. At the start of Operation Provide Comfort, President H.W. Bush stated that the US military would not get involved in Iraq's domestic politics. Yet, the US no-fly zone provided protection for the formation of a politically autonomous region that then experienced a civil war where the former dictator was
invited back in to aid one of the belligerent parties. Operation Unified Protector was in direct response to the fear that the Qadhafi regime was about to massacre its own civilians. President Obama specifically stated his intention was not to initiate regime change. Despite these statements, the coalition air campaign drastically changed the domestic balance of power allowing a loose alliance of opposition groups to depose the government.

The data correlates no-fly zones and political instability, but does not show a causal relationship. No-fly zones were established to address humanitarian crises that were themselves the byproducts of civil war. In both cases civil wars were already underway at the start of the respective no-fly zones, and in both cases there were brief moments of stability after the completion of operations, followed by relapses into conflict. This study has not discussed the changing policy goals as policymakers reacted to facts on the ground, but instead focuses on strategic goals at the time of implementation as a baseline for measuring outcomes. Furthermore, this study reveals that Benard's typology for categorizing no-fly zones does not adequately capture the true nature of the conflicts. Operation Provide Comfort deterred regime airpower and postponed in all three types, but was unable to prevent the outbreak of Kurdish fighting, as demonstrated in Type 3. Operation Unified Protector not only deterred regime airpower, again captured by all three Types, but also destroyed regime ground assets. It simultaneously provided close air support, as demonstrated in Type 1, but for rebel forces as opposed to coalition troops. The two cases examined in this piece do not fit neatly into any of the types, but rather draw from elements of each.

Conclusion and Recommendation

A no-fly zone in Syria will only weaken Bashar al-Assad's regime and may not be possible given Russia's current deployment. As the US hopes to empower democratic opposition elements, a no-fly zone is likely to aid the Islamic extremist groups it opposes. A successful no-fly zone in Syria requires the deployment of ground troops to guarantee that protected enclaves are not continuously targeted by militant groups. Furthermore, a no-fly zone requires that both the regime and rebel factions are roughly equally degraded, so as to prevent the balance of power from shifting drastically to one side's advantage with a negotiated settlement being the only real conflict termination strategy short of all-out victory by one side. Pursuing this strategy has become significantly more challenging given Russian intervention in direct support of the regime. While the US and international community have made real progress in negotiating a temporary “cessation of hostilities,” they will need to take a long-term approach to managing relations within the diverse opposition to prevent future conflict.

The no-fly zones examined in Iraq and Libya weakened regime power and allowed opposition groups to gain political control. While the no-fly zones were successfully established to protect innocent lives, they may have caused or extended conflict, leading to further suffering and destabilization. Policymakers must take these long-term outcomes into consideration when advocating for any future use of no-fly zones as intervention strategies.

Dylan MaGuire is a doctoral student in political science at Northeastern University where he focuses on security issues in the Middle East. Previously, he worked on USAID-funded political development projects in Jordan and Morocco.
partite summits backing the Greek Cypriot position to continue engaging in natural gas extraction, production, and exporting activities without a negotiated settlement of the maritime delimitation dispute. The uniting factor between these parties is the need to develop a common position and enhance their partnership on energy security. Cypriot authorities are mindful of the large-scale energy projects and the political implications this has for the region. Turkey’s reaction to the exploitation of natural resources should not be viewed in isolation.

Turkey’s Geopolitical Position

Turkey remains an important player in energy geopolitics, acting first and foremost as a transit country along the route between central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement to drop the planned South Stream pipeline project in favor of Turkey as its preferred partner, for an alternative transit route, was perceived with joy in some circles. This positive climate hovers over on a contractual cooperation in large-scale energy projects that disturbed the political process that led to the conventional stance of the region.

As a key actor, Turkey should realign its strategy and pursue value-creating maritime negotiations with all littoral states in the region.

Cypriot Maritime Dispute

Natural gas now stands as the most important pillar in Turkey’s demand for energy, as the world’s energy supply and demand cartography changes. Turkey emerges both as a major conduit and a heavy importer. Since Turkey is Gazprom’s second largest export destination after Germany, access to alternative sources of energy in the European Mediterranean would decrease its excessive dependence on a single supplier. Therefore, the exploitation of natural gas resources should not be deferred until a comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem is reached. Stressing future gains, Israel calls on Cyprus and Turkey to settle their differences and agree on a roadmap to the most commercially viable option to deliver Eastern Mediterranean gas to Europe. In December 2014, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement to drop the planned South Stream pipeline project in favor of Turkey as its preferred partner, for an alternative transit route, was perceived with joy in some circles. This positive climate hovers over on a contractual cooperation in large-scale energy projects that disturbed the political process that led to the conventional stance of the region.

As a key actor, Turkey should realign its strategy and pursue value-creating maritime negotiations with all littoral states in the region.
Serhat S. Çubukçuoğlu is a freelance researcher in global development and politics. With an MA in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, his areas of interest are energy diplomacy and conflict resolution in the developing world. Çubukçuoğlu’s most recent research is about energy geopolitics in the Middle East and the application of international law to maritime delimitation disputes for exploitation of hydrocarbons in the eastern Mediterranean Sea.

Women in the Men’s House: The Integration of Women in the Algerian Military

By Dr. Dalia Ghanem-Yazbeck

Abstract

There are many studies on women in the military (gender, cultural, feminist social studies, etc.), but research on women in the Algerian military is in an embryonic state. In fact, it is fair enough to say that to date no study has been conducted regarding this topic, at least to the best of the author’s knowledge. To be specific, quite little information exists about the Algerian army as a whole. This is due to the culture of secrecy that surrounds the institution—dubbed by the Algerian press “La grande muette”—despite its efforts to open up and communicate more information with the public, as demonstrated by the Communication Division of Information and Guidance within the Algerian Ministry of Defense. Integrating women into the military has become an issue of increasing importance that deserves further attention from military decision-makers and researchers, particularly because the number of women joining the Algerian army has increased dramatically between 1978 and 2015.

This article is centered on the narrative and discourses about females as they appear in the official monthly magazine of the Algerian People’s National Army (PNA), El Djich. Focus is placed on linguistic and visual elements of the publication. These aspects are further strengthened through information gained from interviews with former PNA officials. As a caveat, this piece is not about the technicalities (e.g., the number of women enlisting, how they are treated, and what opportunities they can enjoy). For practical reasons, in particular the institution’s lack of cooperation and transparency, the original purpose of the study—which was to observe this technical dimension—shifted to an angle that would not force the author to undertake an in-depth ethnographic fieldwork assignment. In addition, it should be noted that interviews were conducted only with men because all women contacted were nervous and concerned about the research. Thus, this piece can be perceived as the beginning of a more ambitious ethnographic study on women and the military in Algeria.

Since 2006, five women have been promoted to general in the PNA, one of the first and only armies in the Arab world to enable women to reach such a ranking. This decision was based on the presidential decree 06-02 of 28 February 2006, which made the status of women in the military legally equal to that of their male counterparts. However, the legislation on equality does not represent a fundamental shift in the PNA’s approach, rather it is a public relations move for the PNA to portray itself as liberal, equal, and open to all segments of society—although it claims to represent. Despite its numeric advantages, this paper argues that the PNA still has a long way to go in fostering a truly equal environment for women in the military.

In an effort to implement the aforementioned decree, the Algerian army established a formal policy framework in 2006 for equal opportunities in the army. The PNA has also made efforts toward recruiting and acknowledging their right to work within the institution. Practical measures such as maternity leave, retirement, night duties, and extended leave for specific cases...
(such as raising a child under the age of three, taking care of a disabled family member, or for academic pursuits), as well as the construction of new facilities were taken to implement the new statute and facilitate women's participation in the army. Consequently, women have a more robust presence in the army than ever before; there are currently thirty times more women in service than there were in 1978. Today, women are also admitted in several military institutions, such as Algeria’s Cadet Academy, in which they accounted for 18 percent of all recruits in 2013. Women are also accepted in the Naval Academy, in which they represented 31.5 percent of 2013 recruits. They are similarly admitted into the National Gendarmerie Academy, the National Academy of Military Health, the Academy of Military Administration, the Special Military Academy, and the Regional School of Maintenance of Transmission Material.

Yet, running counter to the equality decree, there are attitudes featuring a “combination of inclusion and exclusion” exhibited towards women in the Algerian army. Based on research that involved an analysis of the official PNA magazine El Djeich (Algerian for “army”) and interviews with former military personnel, women are neither fully integrated nor completely excluded. This unfinished integration is due to three main factors: the ways in which women are represented in the PNA, a traditional gender-based division of labor in the military, and the prevalence of “protective paternalism” towards them.

A Sexualized and Contradictory Representation of Military Women

A corpus of forty issues from 2011 to 2014 of El Djeich was analyzed in an interpretative textual approach. This includes an examination of what was said about women and the manner in which it was said. Additionally, careful attention was given to the pictures of women. From this research I found the military institution draws a sharp line between males and females, reinforcing gender divisions. It also links masculinity and war. From this research I found that the military institution draws a sharp line between males and females, reinforcing gender divisions. It also links masculinity and war.

An exception was found in a special April 2013 issue for women’s day titled “PNA: History and Memory of the Fiftieth Anniversary.” There is a woman in military fatigues (land army) from behind. She is standing up, wearing a helmet, with her hair visible and tied back. She is holding a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG7). In another picture, titled “Algerian Women: More Than 50 Years of Sacrifices and Abnegation,” there is a woman holding a Vickers–Berthier (VB MK1) machine gun. The main narrative of these rare pictures is to show the ability of women as fighters within the PNA: they can fight, use weapons, and have special skills like men. These representations help negate the army’s male-forward, but similarly, emphasize the “hyper-virile” character of the military institution that is and remains primarily male and martial. A contradiction also exists here, as women are attributed certain qualities in the magazine traditionally associated with men, such as bravery, courage, determination, strength, and stamina. One has to acknowledge the PNA’s efforts to offer women the same chance to work in the army and be equal with their male counterparts. However, by displaying women less often than men, feminizing them, continuously representing them in passive positions, and eluding imagery of women and warfare, the PNA only reinforces gender division and strengthens the associations between virility, masculinity, and war.

The Traditional Sexual Division of Labor

In the Algerian military, women are recruited based on an equality policy. However, they suffer from a traditional sexual division of labor and a resistance to their full participation in the PNA. According to interview with former military officials, the majority of women occupy subordinate positions. Today, as during the Algerian War of Independence (1954 to 1962), women are still the “auxiliaries” of the male counterparts. Indeed, during the War of independence, the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) and its armed wing, the Armée de Libération Nationale (NAL), advertised heroic images of les poseuses de bombes (roughly translated to the “installers of bombs”)—a term used to describe leading female combatants such as Djamilah Bouhired, Hassiba Ben Bouali, and Zohra Drif—in order to present itself as an avant-garde for a progressive audience. Images of combatant women, however, were not the rule, but rather the exception. Algerian women posing with military outfits and a gun constituted the face of the FLN/NLA to the outside world, a way of saying “our women are heroes of the revolution against colonialism, and they are not victims of any kind of dominant patriarchy.” Today, as before, women are only recruited to the army for what are considered “suitable” positions. As explained by a former male lieutenant-colonel explains, “Women do work in different sectors and there is no segregation against them, not at all . . . They have access to all sectors, they can work wherever they want . . . even if they remain localized in female jobs that are more suitable for their nature, you know, like administration, the secretariat or social services or interpretation, also the judicial service . . . but this is their choice.”

Based on interviews with former military personnel it can be discerned that the majority of women in the Algerian army are concentrated in the communications department. Some work as switchboard operators, while others serve as map-makers, translators, or data entry personnel. Figures from El Djeich confirm this trend: the army’s information and communications department employs 17 percent of women enlisted in the military and 31 percent of the civilian women assimilated in the military. The health department employs 17 percent of enlisted women. A substantial portion of enlisted women also work in educational roles as instructors, researchers, or scientists.

As M. Wechsler Segal explains, “The degree of gender segregation in the civilian occupational structure also affects women’s military participation, although the relationship is not linear.” The pattern of minimal women’s participation in the PNA mirrors the trend in the gendered division of the national labor force. Indeed, out of 10.7 million employed people in Algeria, 1.9 million are women, or only 18.6 percent. To put that into context, in 2014, women made up 49.7 percent of the country’s total population. Despite women’s open access to the workplace—as a result of mass education with a female youth literacy rate of 80 percent in 2014—their access to decision-making positions is inconsequential. The
military echoes this trend; however, data showing the number of women occupying senior ranks is not available. Nevertheless, it is highly revealing that, on the day when Fatma-Zohra Arajoun became the first woman promoted to general on 5 July 2009, fifty-one men also achieved the same rank. Women are still over-represented in lower paying positions and concentrated in a few sectors traditionally seen as "feminine." As such, there is a high proportion of women in health. More than 50 percent of medical maîtres-assistants (assistant professors) are women, and more than forty-eight of paramedics are female. Women constitute even higher proportions in the education sector. In 2011 they accounted for 73.9 percent of those working in pre-primary education, 54.9 percent in primary education, and 39.2 percent in higher education. In the same year, women accounted for 67.94 percent of the employees of the National Radio Staff. They also constitute lower proportions in positions of higher status: there are only 11.4 percent of senior positions (in ministries, as secretaries—generals, director generals, chiefs of ministries, ambassadors, and executives in central government institutions, public bodies, and local authorities) that are occupied by women. In the judiciary sector, women constitute only 24 percent of the Supreme Court, and there is only one female general prosecutor who was appointed in 2014.

"Even in the Military, a Woman is Still a Woman . . . and a Mother Above All"

Based on interviews conducted for this research, another illustration of women’s limited integration in the army is the inequality in training, though the institution leaves it to the women’s discretion to decide which physical exercises to partake in. As one former male PNA colonel states, “If a military woman wants to do the same drills as men, she can do so, but only if she wants to . . . but it is useless . . . because she does not need it. It is up to her. It is also up to the instructor’s personality—if he considers her equal to men, he will ask her to perform the training exactly like the men . . . but he cannot oblige her. Women have the right to decline participation in a drill because they are women. A man cannot have any excuse.”

According to all interviewees, in addition to segregation in field exercise, women cannot serve in the infantry, armor, or field artillery branches slated for direct ground combat. One former lieutenant-colonel states, “Women don’t go into combat. It is well-known but not written down because it is bad publicity . . . [Women] don’t participate in combat missions; it is useless to make them do these exercises that they are never going to execute.”

This exclusion is also true in the air force, as women are trained to become pilots, but generally work in transportation units or in flight training. Physiological differences (body composition, strength, and endurance) remain the most cited justification for the segregation. As a male lieutenant-colonel states, “Let’s be honest, women are not made the same, it is Mother Nature who decided . . . but this does not mean that there is no equality. There is total equality in the institution, but women have to be protected, so the institution protects them.”

The combat ban reflects traditional, paternalistic attitudes toward women who are excluded from full participation in the military. This paternalism deprives women of the treatment their male counterparts receive, therefore undermining their training and capacities as female soldiers. It also leads to female exclusion from prestigious military positions for which combat experience is the key. There are no explicit regulations governing the field exercise segregation because it would damage the PNA’s projected image of equality. However, according to all interviewees, there are “special arrangements” made for female soldiers.

All interviewees supported the view that women cannot go through the same military training as men because of physical inadequacies, explaining that because of their “delicate nature” women need to be protected. As a retired commandant concludes, “Even in the military, a woman is still a woman . . . and a mother above all.”

Conclusion

Despite the unfinished integration, women’s recruitment to the PNA remains a positive accomplishment, specifically in comparison with the army’s previous stance on the issue and when viewing alongside other regional militaries. The PNA has made important and valuable efforts in recruiting women and acknowledging their rights, but their integration into the military remains incomplete. In order to overcome the gap between the discourse of equality and the reality for women in the military, the PNA needs to start regarding and treating women as full-fledged soldiers and equal members of its institution.

Note: A longer version of this study was published by the Carnegie Middle East Center, as part of the 2014–2015 "Renegotiating Civil-Military Relations in Arab States: Political and Economic Governance in Transition" Project.

Dr. Dalia Ghannem-Yazbeck is a research analyst at the Carnegie Middle East Center (CMEC) in Lebanon. Ghannem-Yazbeck is an expert on political violence, terrorism, and the radicalization process, with a focus on Jihadism in Algeria. She has published pieces on political and extremist violence, including work on Islam in Algeria, on the Islamic state organization, and the participation of women in jihadi groups. She has been a regular commentator on issues in different Arab and international print and audio-visual media. She holds a PhD from the University of Versailles Saint-Quentin-En-Yvelines (France) and a master’s degree in political science from the University of La Sorbonne (France).

Endnotes
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
16. It should be noted that “labor force” mentioned here describes those working for an industry or company where employment is structured and paid in a formal way.
22. Ibid.

Women doing computer work. Image taken from Al Djefich Magazine.
The Kurdish Divide: Reshaping of Interests and Actors in Syria’s War

By Joseph Sadek

Abstract
The war in Syria has devastated the country and the violence has bled into neighboring states. As a result, hundreds of thousands have died and millions have fled the country. The forces fueling this conflict come from many sources, each having their own complexities while intertwining with one another. Kurdish armed groups are no exception. Today, while violence between Turkey and its Kurdish population escalates, so too does Kurdish involvement in the war in Syria. The diverse political and military objectives of the Kurds in the region are not conducive for cooperation. The Turkish-based Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Syrian-based Democratic Union Party (PYD) are one example of the growing divide. As the war in Syria goes on, inter-group objectives and international alliances will produce greater competition and division between Kurdish armed groups.

Introduction
When Kurdish armed groups captured Tel Abyad in June 2015 many feared Kurdish militias were undertaking an ethnic cleansing of Arabs in the Syrian border town. The Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its paramilitary wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), with assistance from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), were coordinating with the US led, Turkish-Joint Task Force to retake an important Daesh supply route in a region the Kurds call Rojava in northeastern Syria. By mid-June, the Kurdish militias had captured a strip of land on Syria’s northern border from Kobani (also known as Ain al-Alar) to the Iraqi border (see Figure 1).

While recapturing Tel Abyad was a strategic victory against Daesh, the new reality reveals something much grimmer for Ankara: Turkey now faces a formidable Syrian-Kurdish presence along its southern border. Soon after the Kurdish gains, it became clear that Ankara was doing more than fighting the so-called Islamic State: Turkey’s air campaign was targeting Kurdish armed groups—primarily the PKK—and to an extent, the YPG/YPD. The air campaign ended the possibility of a lasting cease-fire. For Turkey, the war in Syria has rekindled tensions between the PKK and Ankara especially in its east. Beyond rebuffing the PKK inside the country, Turkey’s domestic fight and Syrian policy caused a divergence of priorities between the PYD-YPG and the PKK. For the Kurds, internal division makes the possibility of an autonomous Kurdish government, cohesive political strategy, and an independent state, increasingly uncertain.

History
One cannot accurately assess Turkey’s relationship with its Kurdish population unless the history of Turkey’s founding moment is examined. It was the 1920 Treaty of Sevres that first sought to answer the Kurdish question, which was designed to evaluate the Kurdish people’s merits of self-determination by the victors of World War I. This took place among the disassembling of the Ottoman Empire into mandates by Britain and France. It was within this political context that the father of the emergent Turkish state, Mustafa Kemal, and his Republican elite were operating. This elite class ultimately ignored the treaty and defined the terms of the Turkish nation, effectively neutralizing what would have been the establishment of a Kurdish State.

Syrian Civil War: PKK, PYD, and Turkey’s Policies and Decisions

In 2013, Ankara began to take a much more active role in the Syrian War. While the Erdogan government called for Syrian President Bashar al Assad to step down in 2011, it has only recently begun ramping up support to opposition groups—primarily the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and Ahrar al-Sham. Ankara’s support for the Syrian opposition was consistent with its 2011 statements, its policy having second-order effects for Syria’s Kurds.

On a number of occasions, the emboldened and predominately Arab Ahrar al Sham and FSA clashed with the PKK and the PYD—especially throughout 2012 and 2013. Although this may not have been the intended consequence of Ankara’s policies, it surely saw Arab-Kurdish clashes in the Turkish state’s interest. Turkey’s intervention on its southern border, amid clashes in northern Syria, only increased over the next two years. After a series of terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, Turkish policymakers signaled that it would cooperate evermore closely with the US-led mission to degrade and destroy Daesh. Turkey’s granting of access to Incirlik Air Base was an important contribution to the air campaign. However, it soon became clear that Ankara’s military involvement focused largely on targeting Kurdish-held positions in Tal Abyad and Kobani. By targeting its enemies on the ground, Turkey’s joint air campaign threatened the undoing of US efforts a month earlier that allowed the same Kurdish groups to recapture the two key cities.

The 2015 Turkish Elections
Further contributing to the devolution of Turkish-Kurdish relations, as a result of the aforementioned military campaign, is the political fallout after the electoral losses of the Justice Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s 2015 parliamentary election. The elections gave the liberal, Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP) thirteen percent of the vote and admittance into the Turkish Parliament (admittance requires a ten percent minimum). After the election, the AKP, the country’s largest bloc, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was forced to form a coalition government in parliament. The AKP leadership was unable to negotiate a coalition with the Republican People’s Party within the constitutionally mandated forty-five-day time period. Optimists believed that an AKP-HDP coalition might coalesce, but hardliners and political jockeying on both sides made any agreement unlikely. In fact, many believed Erdogan’s party actively campaigned to undermine the HDP, reflecting the deep-seated mistrust that HDP has for the ruling AKP. Most recently, this is reflected in AKP’s campaign to lift immunity from HDP parliamentarians.

The summer 2015 terrorist attacks during the election cycle initially heightened electoral antago-
nism as AKP and HDP both seized the opportunity to blame the other for inciting the violence. While HDP leaders argued that Turkey’s political polarized society has been the intended consequence of Ankara’s policies, it surely saw Arab-Kurdish clashes in the Turkish state’s interest. Turkey’s intervention on its southern border, amid clashes in northern Syria, only increased over the next two years. After a series of terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, Turkish policymakers signaled that it would cooperate evermore closely with the US-led mission to degrade and destroy Daesh. Turkey’s granting of access to Incirlik Air Base was an important contribution to the air campaign. However, it soon became clear that Ankara’s military involvement focused largely on targeting Kurdish-held positions in Tal Abyad and Kobani. By targeting its enemies on the ground, Turkey’s joint air campaign threatened the undoing of US efforts a month earlier that allowed the same Kurdish groups to recapture the two key cities.

The 2015 Turkish Elections
Further contributing to the devolution of Turkish-Kurdish relations, as a result of the aforementioned military campaign, is the political fallout after the electoral losses of the Justice Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s 2015 parliamentary election. The elections gave the liberal, Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP) thirteen percent of the vote and admittance into the Turkish Parliament (admittance requires a ten percent minimum). After the election, the AKP, the country’s largest bloc, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was forced to form a coalition government in parliament. The AKP leadership was unable to negotiate a coalition with the Republican People’s Party within the constitutionally mandated forty-five-day time period. Optimists believed that an AKP-HDP coalition might coalesce, but hardliners and political jockeying on both sides made any agreement unlikely. In fact, many believed Erdogan’s party actively campaigned to undermine the HDP, reflecting the deep-seated mistrust that HDP has for the ruling AKP. Most recently, this is reflected in AKP’s campaign to lift immunity from HDP parliamentarians.

Turkey’s participation in the Syrian war and the strong-arm politics by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the face of the Syrian war has made addressing Kurdish grievances a tertiary priority.

The Turkish political mainstream response to the 2015 elections initiated a second front of engagement between Turkey and its Kurdish citizens. For forty years Ankara has dealt with a PKK insurgency, but as Turkey has democratized, political space has opened for Kurdish participation in national politics. The 2015 national parliamentary elections gave the AKP leadership a mandate not to negotiate with the PKK. It was especially important for internal Kurdish politics in Turkey; HDP’s rise was not perceived as a destabilizing force. AKP won back a majority in Parliament. HDP lost almost three percentage points, but remained above the parliamentary threshold of ten percent.

The summer 2015 terrorist attacks during the election cycle initially heightened electoral antag-
nism as AKP and HDP both seized the opportunity to blame the other for inciting the violence. While HDP leaders argued that Turkey’s political polarized society has been the intended consequence of Ankara’s policies, it surely saw Arab-Kurdish clashes in the Turkish state’s interest. Turkey’s intervention on its southern border, amid clashes in northern Syria, only increased over the next two years. After a series of terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, Turkish policymakers signaled that it would cooperate evermore closely with the US-led mission to degrade and destroy Daesh. Turkey’s granting of access to Incirlik Air Base was an important contribution to the air campaign. However, it soon became clear that Ankara’s military involvement focused largely on targeting Kurdish-held positions in Tal Abyad and Kobani. By targeting its enemies on the ground, Turkey’s joint air campaign threatened the undoing of US efforts a month earlier that allowed the same Kurdish groups to recapture the two key cities.

The 2015 Turkish Elections
Further contributing to the devolution of Turkish-Kurdish relations, as a result of the aforementioned military campaign, is the political fallout after the electoral losses of the Justice Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s 2015 parliamentary election. The elections gave the liberal, Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP) thirteen percent of the vote and admittance into the Turkish Parliament (admittance requires a ten percent minimum). After the election, the AKP, the country’s largest bloc, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was forced to form a coalition government in parliament. The AKP leadership was unable to negotiate a coalition with the Republican People’s Party within the constitutionally mandated forty-five-day time period. Optimists believed that an AKP-HDP coalition might coalesce, but hardliners and political jockeying on both sides made any agreement unlikely. In fact, many believed Erdogan’s party actively campaigned to undermine the HDP, reflecting the deep-seated mistrust that HDP has for the ruling AKP. Most recently, this is reflected in AKP’s campaign to lift immunity from HDP parliamentarians.

The summer 2015 terrorist attacks during the election cycle initially heightened electoral antag-
nism as AKP and HDP both seized the opportunity to blame the other for inciting the violence. While HDP leaders argued that Turkey’s political polarized society has been the intended consequence of Ankara’s policies, it surely saw Arab-Kurdish clashes in the Turkish state’s interest. Turkey’s intervention on its southern border, amid clashes in northern Syria, only increased over the next two years. After a series of terrorist attacks in the summer of 2015, Turkish policymakers signaled that it would cooperate evermore closely with the US-led mission to degrade and destroy Daesh. Turkey’s granting of access to Incirlik Air Base was an important contribution to the air campaign. However, it soon became clear that Ankara’s military involvement focused largely on targeting Kurdish-held positions in Tal Abyad and Kobani. By targeting its enemies on the ground, Turkey’s joint air campaign threatened the undoing of US efforts a month earlier that allowed the same Kurdish groups to recapture the two key cities.

The 2015 Turkish Elections
Further contributing to the devolution of Turkish-Kurdish relations, as a result of the aforementioned military campaign, is the political fallout after the electoral losses of the Justice Development Party (AKP) in Turkey’s 2015 parliamentary election. The elections gave the liberal, Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP) thirteen percent of the vote and admittance into the Turkish Parliament (admittance requires a ten percent minimum). After the election, the AKP, the country’s largest bloc, led by Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was forced to form a coalition government in parliament. The AKP leadership was unable to negotiate a coalition with the Republican People’s Party within the constitutionally mandated forty-five-day time period. Optimists believed that an AKP-HDP coalition might coalesce, but hardliners and political jockeying on both sides made any agreement unlikely. In fact, many believed Erdogan’s party actively campaigned to undermine the HDP, reflecting the deep-seated mistrust that HDP has for the ruling AKP. Most recently, this is reflected in AKP’s campaign to lift immunity from HDP parliamentarians.
to a one that is more politically centered.

An Untenable Approach
The International Crisis Group (ICG) has rightly argued that addressing the Kurdish insurgency requires separating the conflict with the PKK from addressing the legitimate concerns of Turkey’s Kurdish citizens. The ICG also argues that confronting more social and political rights to Kurds is a human rights issue and addressing Kurdish grievances would yield Ankara a better relationship with all of its citizens. Doing so would signal to the PKK that Ankara is willing to offer real concessions for peace, undermining PKK violence. However, Turkey’s participation in the Syrian war and the strong-arm policies by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in the face of the Syrian war. However, the PKK was able to exploit grievances as a tertiary priority. Similarly, Kurdish militia participation in the war in Syria makes peaceful negotiations more complex.

The PKK and PYD: Two Distinct Geographies
As the Syrian war continues unabated, PKK and PYD interests, as well as their operational objectives, will diverge. The PKK primary focus remains protecting the Syrian–Kurdish populations from external threats. In the opening stages of the war in Syria, the PYD maintained a cold peace with the Assad regime, but numerous clashes with regime forces (and opposition groups) have exemplified the Kurds’ resolve in protecting territories under its control. While it has mainly focused on fighting Daesh militants in Syria, it is important to address how the PYD, and its armed YPG wing, will respond to the Turkish military, which has increased its presence on the Turkish-Syrian border. With Turkish air strikes against Syrian-Kurdish positions, the question to ask is: will YPG forces extend operations into Turkey? Most likely, the answer will be no. This is where PKK-YPG divergence becomes clear. The PYD/YPG will remain focused in Syria, while the PKK continues its insurgency in eastern Turkey due to separate priorities and goals.

In late summer 2015, it became clear that Turkey would constitute the PKK’s sphere of operations for four reasons. First, the PKK has been embedded historically in the insurgency against the Turkish State and can easily operate in eastern Turkey from its bases in Iraq and Turkey. Additionally, the PYD/YPG risks damaging its crucial alliance with the Kurds, a relationship with both a political and military dimension.

YPG risks damaging its crucial alliance with US coalition forces by extending into Turkey, America’s NATO ally. External geopolitical alliances play an important role in the PYD’s continued arms and logistical support. Washington does (even if superficially) make a distinction between the PYD/YPG and the PKK; one that strengthens the PYD’s position in the war in Syria vis-à-vis the PKK’s is this distinction. The PYD carefully words its statements regarding regional actors, often claiming that it is not necessarily at war with Turkey, but rather warding off hostile actors. Third, conditions on the ground make the PYD’s focus on Syria more urgent as the expanding threat of Daesh continues to threaten many parts of Kurdish-held territory. Yet, as the US-led coalition helped the YPG recapture Kobani, a day later Daesh cells attacked returning Kurdish-Syrian refugees. Therefore, the threat Turkey poses is not the immediate danger facing the YPG/YPG. Lastly, the priorities of the Turkish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq influence the PYD’s actions. PKK and YPG forces have been the only effective fighting force in Iraq against Daesh, as Peshmerga forces have become overstretched and exhausted through continuous fighting. With this in mind, the PYD knows that it will only continue to get support from the KRG if it takes the fight to Daesh in Iraq and Syria.

The Divergence
Many consider the PYD and the PKK as one Kurdish entity fighting two fronts in Syria and Turkey, respectively. This analysis will regard them as distinct, though the arguments that support the two groups as a unitary actor are addressed first. If the Syrian war continues, and Daesh remains a legitimate threat to the Kurds, then the operational objectives of groups will uniformly focus on Syria and northern Iraq. Kurdish fighters would likely superficially ascribe to the PYD label and shift resources to solely fighting the Islamic State. This argument neglects Turkey’s role in the Syrian war, as well as who is protecting the Kurds from a resource perspective. Therefore, it makes analytical sense to distinguish the PKK and PYD. The argument, however, forgets that the Turkish military’s shift to addressing the Kurdish insurgency as a part of the country has taken center stage. Policymakers in Washington and Brussels clearly prioritize the Daesh threat over any other immediate threats Turkey faces. As a result, NATO will distribute resources and aid to groups fighting the Islamic state, demonstrating that Western objectives favor the PYD’s goals over those of the PKK. As the West and Russia prioritize supporting the PYD over other armed groups, these actions will ostracize the PKK, whose political base demands and comparative advantage favors the insurgency in Turkey. This asymmetry in resources will only deepen between the groups and may cause a faster schism between the two.

This shift in symmetry will affect the PKK insurgency in several ways. With less resources, the PKK may utilize more crude methods of violence against the Turkish state, including terrorist attacks in the form of suicide bombings, mass shootings, and/or improvised explosive devices (IEDs), as proven by 2016 attacks in Ankara. Participation in the Syrian civil war remains another option for PKK operations. However, such a scenario remains doubtful. As stated earlier, the prioritization of positioning PYD forces in Syria means that giving up operational control to the PKK will be unlikely and also unwise. What results as a consequence is a distinct and growing division between the PKK and the PYD/YPG.

Conclusion
The nature of Turkey’s relationship with Kurdish armed groups has significantly evolved over the last forty years. The birth of the Turkish Republic brought with it the ideals of a dominant Turkish identity, as defined by Kemal Mustafa and the Republic elite. These ideals excluded the opportunity of Kurdish cultural and linguistic expression and cannibalized hopes for Kurdish autonomy. The subsequent rise of the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) was a result of Turkey’s policies towards its Kurdish citizens while the PKK insurgency provoked military coups throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Furthermore, the PKK was able to outlast contemporary groups by moving to Syria and establishing coalitions with Syrian and Iraqi Kurds. The growth of the PKK insurgency led to the formation of the Democratic Union Party (PYD)—the Syrian manifestation of the PKK, which has, today, consolidated itself as a legitimate force combatting Daesh and playing a key role in the American-led coalition.

Today’s Turkey must contend with a profound duality in its relations with the Kurds, a relationship with both a political and military dimension. Turkey will surely respond to the insurgent threat that the PKK poses to its population, but the nature of Turkish-Kurdish relations requires more than merely a military solution. Engaging with the Kurds on the political stage will require mutual respect and cooperation. Militarily, earnest efforts to defeat the so-called Islamic State will require cooperation in Syria. It is already clear that the war in Syria has caused a greater division in internal Kurdish politics. As PYD and US-led forces’ objectives continue to gel in Syria, the PKK becomes further isolated. This will lead to a division in resources and widen the gap between the two Kurdish armed groups. These groups were once much closer, but they may become operationally divided in the future. As this division grows, one hopes it does not create further chaos in the region.

Joseph Sadek is a second-year graduate student focusing on public international law and political systems and theories at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Prior to Fletcher, Sadek worked for Ohio State’s John Glenn School of Public Affairs in its Washington office. He served as program coordinator, then manager, of the Washington Academic Internship Program. Joseph holds a BA in international studies from the Ohio State University.

Endnotes
Radicalization in Context: Understanding and Addressing the Path Toward Violent Extremism
By Lauren Fisher

Abstract
Research on violent extremism often conflates two common phrases: X factor is the cause of radicalization in Y country, and X factor is the primary cause of radicalization in Y country. The latter recognizes radicalization as a fusion of multiple factors, while the former incorrectly suggests that individuals follow a fixed path toward extremism. As radicalization increasingly threatens communities across the globe, security officials have created formulas to help identify the individuals most likely to carry out acts of violent extremism. However, such models are destined fail if they do not contextualize the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical individual. The following think piece reviews existing individual-centered models put forth by leading political scientists Marc Sageman, Tore Bjørgo, Tinka Velthuis, and others. It also explores a variety of factors at the micro- and macro-levels that can influence an individual’s process of radicalization.

Introduction
In order to understand how individuals become extremists, scholars must consider the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical individual, as often portrayed in the press; it [was] to join Al-Qaeda, it was not “the path of a lone individual, as often portrayed in the press; it [was]

Micro-Level Drivers of Radicalization
Social Networks
One of the oft-cited theories of radicalization is that social networks drive individuals to join extremist groups. Such is the case in the theory put forth by Marc Sageman in his book Leaderless Jihad. Sageman notes that interpersonal drivers of radicalization typically fall into one of two subcategories: collective radicalization with friends into an extremist group, or individual radicalization because of a friend already in an extremist group. Sageman terms the first type of social radicalization “the Bunches of Guys” theory, which argues that entire groups of friends can undergo a gradual process of radicalization if they isolate themselves from the mainstream and reinforce each other’s radical opinions. Al-Qaeda’s Hamburg cell, which ultimately helped carry out the September 11 terrorist attacks, is an example of this process. Al-Qaedas Hamburg cell consisted of four Middle Eastern students studying in Hamburg, Germany who sought comfort in their shared cultural background. As the group spent less time in the mainstream student community, they began intensifying and reinforcing each other’s radical beliefs. Eventually, when the group traveled to Afghanistan to join Al-Qaeda, it was not “the path of a lone individual, as often portrayed in the press; it [was]
a group adventure.”

The second type of social network radicalization refers to individuals who radicalize because of personal connections with existing members of extremist groups. Within diaspora communities, immigrants tend to drift toward acquaintances, friends, or family members from their own countries of origin. If these acquaintances are already involved in a radical network, they can sway newcomers into said groups. Such is the case with those who carried out the Madrid bombings: five of the seven bombers had been childhood friends in Morocco before moving to Europe. This particular case challenges the common misconception that individuals become involved in radical networks because of a lack of interpersonal relationships. If social networks are primary drivers to radical groups then radicals are not strangers united by ideological worldviews; instead, they are team-mates, neighbors, and family friends.

In order to understand how individuals become extremists, scholars must consider the process of radicalization from the vantage point of the radical, examining the interplay between multiple layers of influence at the micro- and macro-levels.

Psychological Perceptions

Authors John Horgan and Tore Bjørø believe radicalization is more influenced by psychological factors than by social ones. In his book Leaving Terrorism Behind, Bjørø advocates for the need to understand the psychological factors that propel individuals into extremist groups. Because radical groups are characteristically intimate communities, individuals may be pushed toward radicalization if they are in search of identity status, interpersonal connections, or “substitute families.” For example, Kerry Noble, former member of the left-wing cult the Covenant, the Sword, and the Arm of the Lord (CSA), told Harper’s Magazine’s professor David Gross that “outside the cult, [Kerry] felt weak and repeatedly humiliated. Inside, Ellison [the cult leader] made him feel needed and strong.” Thus, rather than joining extremist groups because of social networks, individuals may also radicalize due to a perceived lack of them.

If the process of radicalization emerges from a cost-benefit analysis, individuals may also consider a variety of “pull factors” that deter them from joining radical groups. These factors may include fear of isolation from the mainstream, concerns that joining a radical group may affect future job prospects, or a desire to marry someone in the moderate world. In this way, social networks may still play a role in affecting an individual’s path to radicalization; however, they function more so as deterrents than as incentives.

One of the largest problems with psychological-based theories, though, is data put forth by authors such as Horgan and Bjørø relying heavily on personal testimony from radicals themselves. This is dangerous, as extremists might think they have joined a group for a certain reason and then, psychologically, believe something different. Thus, while the psychological state of the individual undoubtedly plays a significant role in the process of radicalization, it is the most difficult variable to quantify.

Concurrent Factors at the Micro-Level

Although authors tend to emphasize either social or psychological paradigms for understanding radicalization, the Laghriss twins’ 2004 suicide attack plot in Rabat, Morocco, demonstrates the concurrent presence of both models. Sanae Laghriss, one of the twins, began radicalizing after witnessing a TV report citing the death of Palestinian Mohammed al-Dura, who was allegedly killed by Israeli soldiers. This was in reaction to the event in an example of political grievance: a severe psychological association with someone else’s suffering. Individuals who experience political grievances often feel the other’s suffering as if it were his or her own and are thus susceptible to vigilantism. For Sanae, political grievance led her to seek out radical leaders who validated her extreme political outrage.

Conversely, Sanae’s sister, Imane, felt no psychological affiliation with al-Dura, who was allegedly killed during the intifada. Rather, Sanae’s reaction to the event is an example of psychological grievance: a severe political association with someone else’s suffering. Individuals who experience political grievances often feel the other’s suffering as if it were his or her own and are thus susceptible to vigilantism. For Sanae, political grievance led her to seek out radical leaders who validated her extreme political outrage.

In the case of the Laghriss twins, it was so closely connected to her sister, Imane, joined in meeting with Hassan Chaouni, a radical leader, at a community mosque. Through her relationship with her sister, Imane also radicalized, joining a plotted suicide attack against the Moroccan Parliament, even though she lacked the same political ideology that inspired her sister to turn toward fanaticism. For Sanae, political grievance led her to seek out radical leaders who validated her extreme political outrage.

Understanding the broader context of the Laghriss twins helps reveal why these two girls were susceptible to violent extremism, while other teens living under similar conditions remained impervious.

Macro-Level Drivers: The Individual-Centered Model

An individual-centered model should not be that which focuses exclusively on micro-level factors. Instead, a proportionately focusing on drivers at the macro-level is arguably the biggest downfall of existing individualist models. The works of Sageman, Horgan, Bjørø, Veldhuis, and Staun—all leading proponents of the individualist approach—imply that macro-level factors play a smaller role in radicalization because these factors are less directly related to the individual. For example, Staun and Veldhuis argue that poverty, unemployment, and regional politics can only be preconditions for radicalization rather than drivers themselves. However, downplaying macro-level conditions inhibits our ability to fully contextualize an individual’s radicalization.

In the case of the Laghriss twins, for instance, macro-level contextualization is pivotal in understanding why the twins were drawn to the Al Wala’da mosque. Nordic authors Tinka Veldhuis and Jorgen Staun argue that economic conditions impeded the radicalization because these factors are less directly related to the individual. For example, Staun and Veldhuis argue that poverty, unemployment, and regional politics can only be preconditions for radicalization rather than drivers themselves. However, downplaying macro-level conditions inhibits our ability to fully contextualize an individual’s radicalization.

Within the macro-lens, one must again reexamine the need to distinguish between primary and secondary drivers. US military presence alone did not cause a rise of violent extremism in Afghanistan. If that were the case, the global community should expect to see proliferation of terrorism in all regions where the United States stations troops. However, this is not the case. The rise of radicalization in Afghanistan, therefore, must be contextualized with the secondary drivers at play in order to fully understand why American intervention there
pushed individuals to join radical groups. First and foremost, extremist groups like the Taliban already had strong footholds in tribal areas of Afghanistan prior to American intervention, rendering the area particularly vulnerable to radicalization. In order to most effectively combat the growing threat of terror, policymakers and academics must maintain a flexible approach to violent extremism. Instead of trying to create a one-size-fits-all formula for understanding radicalization, they should grow their understandings of what factors at the micro- and macro-levels can be formative in moving individuals away from mainstream society.

Furthermore, poor governance, rapidly expanding narcotics trade, and a weak economy—all macro-level factors—functioned as secondary drivers. In ungoverned areas with limited public goods, groups like the Taliban provide education where the state does not. Aghan living in rural areas may have therefore been more receptive to the Taliban because it filled an economic need in the absence of basic government services.

On the micro-level, radicals embedded themselves in host communities by setting up small business, forming friendships with community members, and marrying locals. This interpersonal infiltration likely facilitated group membership through the social network theories discussed earlier. On the psychological level, personal experiences with death and violence, especially those at the hands of American troops, helped facilitate radicalization among the affected population. With shared interests and personal connections to radical groups were not decisive in the rise of Afghanistan’s Taliban, they contextualize the driving variable in a way that may help to explain why US military presence fueled extremism in Afghanistan but not necessarily in other nations.

The Age of the Internet

Since the rise of the Internet, online platforms have created virtual spaces where individuals can radicalize from the comfort of their own homes. Though the Internet itself is not a driver of radicalization, it plays a key role in facilitating contemporary radicalization through two primary channels: it creates virtual social networks through chat rooms and makes information available on how to carry out acts of violence without ever having to join an extremist group. Online radical communities, often in the form of semi-private chat rooms, represent a fusion of the social networks and rational choice theories discussed earlier in this piece. Individuals who feel isolated from their “RL” (real life) communities may join chat rooms seeking a sense of belonging. Such is the case with a twenty-three-year-old American woman who spent hours each day chatting online with ISIS members because she was frequently by herself, and “they [ISIS members] were online all the time.” Once inside chat forums, individuals may succumb to Sageman’s “Bunches of Sheep” theory that chat room members can discuss and validate each other’s thoughts, creating an echo chamber where existing radicals (who can serve as forum moderators) remotely inject radical ideas.

In addition to creating virtual social spheres, the Internet allows individuals interested in carrying out acts of violence to do so in the name of radical ideology without necessarily believing in the ideology or having actual membership in a radical group. Such is the case of the Tsarnaev brothers, who downloaded two bombs to the Boston Marathon in April 2013. The attack followed explicit instructions in an article titled “How to Build a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom” from Al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine. Though the Tsarnaev brothers had received no consent, approval, or direct contact with Al-Qaeda leadership, they were able to download propaganda from the Internet to carry out their attack.

While the Internet plays an integral role in understanding the contemporary threat of extremism, it alone is unlikely to be a primary driver of radicalization. The Internet functions more to facilitate the radicalization process than to begin it. As such, the Internet should be regarded as a dangerous vehicle that is making radicalization both more accessible for potential extremists to join, and more difficult for security officials to detect.

Conclusion

Conventional understanding consistently and mistakenly labels radicals as irrational, ideological aberrations. This is often because people are reluctant to confront the reality that radicals can be, and often are, average citizens encountering mortality on a daily life. In order to understand how people become extremists, scholars and security professionals must contextualize the path to extremism and understand how factors at the micro- and macro-levels can be formative in moving individuals away from mainstream society. In doing so, security officials and policymakers can better identify periods of time, people, and communities who may be particularly susceptible to the radicalization process without assuming that everyone who fits a certain mold must be on the path to violence.

Lauren Fisher began studying political science at Colby College, where she received her BA in government. During her time at Colby, she published an article about Jewish violent extremism in the FSigma Alpha Journal of Political Science. After receiving her BA, Fisher went on to complete her MA in security and diplomacy at Tel Aviv University in Israel. Throughout her graduate coursework, Fisher focused much of her research on Al-Qaeda and Islamic radicalization. Fisher served as a research assistant at the International Institute of Counterterrorism (ICT) in Herzliya, Israel. Her research with the ICT culminated in a published report analyzing the threat of Islamic radicalization in the state of Maine. After living in Israel for two years, Fisher has returned to her hometown of Boston, Massachusetts, working as an educator in teen leadership.

Endnotes

1. For the purpose of this work, the term “primary driver” will refer to the most decisive condition in an individual’s path towards extremism. The term “secondary driver” will refer to any complimentary factor that contributes to the radicalization process, though it may not be the most pivotal.
3. For more information on the Hamburg cell, see: “5’the Hamburg Contig,’” National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, United States government, 21 August 2004.
4. Serhat S. Çakıboğlu, “The EIZ Defilement Dispute Between Cyprus and Turkey – Part II,” Tufts University, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1 December 2014.
5. Ibid.
13. Turkey Plans to Build a Pipeline from Israel,” Natural Gas Europe, 21 December 2015.
19. Ibid.
Against Apartheid: The Case for Boycotting Israeli Universities Book Review
By Adi Saleem Bharat


Ashley Dawson and Bill Mullen’s edited essay collection is a timely contribution to the ongoing debate surrounding academic boycott of Israeli universities. Against Apartheid opens with a foreword by Ali Abuminah, followed by an introduction by the editors. The book is then divided into five sections. In his foreword, Abuminah states, “the struggle for the sake of conscience is a never-ending battle for Justice.” This existential crisis, according to Abuminah, is over whether universities can remain “sites for dissent, critical scholarship, and innovation.” In their introduction, Ashley Dawson and Bill Mullen describe the book as “a tool, a guidebook, and a living chronicle (of the BDS movement).” For Dawson and Mullen, like Abuminah, there is a larger project beyond challenging Israeli apartheid, namely, “building a wider left resistance in our neoliberal times.” They also explain the use of the term “apartheid” as applied to Israel. While they “analyze the conditions in the occupied Palestinian territories and Israel to those in South Africa during the apartheid era,” they do not mean to imply that the situations are similar. The editors admit significant differences between apartheid South Africa and Israel, but insist that “these differences should not obscure their fundamental similarities.” Dawson and Mullen then briefly describe the complicity of Israeli academic institutions with the actions of their government, before charting the trajectory of academic boycotts since 2004.

In the first section of Against Apartheid, “From the Front Lines: Palestinian Scholars Make the Case for Academic Boycott,” four Palestinian scholars describe firsthand the limitations and restrictions imposed upon Palestinian academics, as well as the complicity of Israeli universities in this and in the occupation. The second section, “Taking on the Settler-Colonial University: Academic Boycott and Academic Freedom,” comprises chapters that attempt to demonstrate the efficacy of boycott and to further explain the reasons for “singling out” Israel. David Lloyd and Malini Johar Schuebler, for example, write in “The Israeli State of Exception and the Case of Academic Boycott” that “it is because Israel is constantly distinguished or singled out from other nations, particularly in the United States, that a BDS campaign is justified.” Additionally, the chapters in this section challenge the absolutist approach to academic freedom. The third section, “The Academic Boycott of Israeli Universities in Historical Context,” aims to historicize the subject at hand. Like the other chapters in this section, Ilan Pappe’s “The Boycott Will Work: An Israeli Perspective” draws upon historical progressions since 1948 to argue that pressure from the outside is necessary in order to successfully coerce a paradigm shift that would lead to “finding a formula for joint living.”

Section four, “Students and Scholars in the Struggle, Under Attack,” describes the ways in which universities repress BDS activity on campuses. The last section, “New Horizons for the Academic Boycott of Israel” is a look to the future. Inter alia, the chapters in this section aim to underscore the notion that academic boycotts, and BDS in general, are not to be ends unto themselves, but rather means to an end. Unfortunately, it is not always clear what end is envisioned. In this section, Joseph Massads’s “Recognizing Palestine, BDS, and the Survival of Israel” implicitly rejects the two-state solution and troublingly seems to favor, not merely the end of the occupation, but the end of Israel itself.

For different reasons, a few chapters in particular deserve to be brought to attention. Lisa Taraki’s “The Complicity of the Israeli Academy in the Structures of Domination and State Violence” makes the case for academic boycott by describing the complicity of Israeli academics and academic institutions in Israeli state policies that negatively impact Palestinians. Her main point is that, while there are “disident” Israeli academics, the Israeli academy is structurally complicit in state violence against Palestinians. Taraki discusses the careers of three Israeli academics, namely Tehoshafat Haratiki, Menahem Milson, and Shlomo Gazit, in order to demonstrate that the “Israeli university leadership […] does not find anything morally amiss in appointing to top posts individuals known to have supervised and designed repressive measures and persistently committed violations of international humanitarian law against Palestinians in their other careers as military and intelligence functionaries.” She goes on to explain that this is not a thing of the past and that “a quick review of the names of the faculty, directors, or staff of these institutes shows that they have had careers with the Israeli military and intelligence establishment.” Taraki then challenges the claim that academic boycott “punishes one of the most antithetical domains of influence in Israel, namely Israeli academics.” This, she writes, is a seriously flawed depiction. According to Taraki, the only times Israeli academics have taken a stand, they’ve released statements and resolutions that were “so general as to dilute the message.” At the end of her chapter, Taraki acknowledges that “this does not mean that there are no dissident academics in Israel [but] the fact remains that the Israeli academy as an institution is complicit in violations of international law, grave violations of international humanitarian law, and outright war crimes.”

Rima Najjar Kapitans’s “Climbing Down From the Ivory Tower: Double Standards and the Use of Academic Boycotts to Achieve Social and Economic Justice” highlights the possible double standards of the American Association of University Professors (AAUP). She notes that in another international case (i.e. Singapore) the AAUP suggested the use of academic boycott was “not only a right but an obligation.” In the case of the establishment of a Yale campus in Singapore—a country with a problematic human rights record—the AAUP had voiced concerns over Yale’s collaboration with Singapore. This is in contrast to the anti-boycott stance the AAUP has taken with regards to Israel. As Kapitan writes, “[AAUP] concerns stemmed partly from a worry that the establishment of the campus might open some space for political and social implications” because it would entail directly “assist[ing] the Singapore government in achieving greater financial strength and cultural legitimacy.” For the AAUP, Yale has the obligation to avoid legitimizing countries with “odious” laws. By bringing up this international case, Kapitan makes a persuasive argument about the exception that seems to be made for Israel by some of those who position themselves as defenders of academic freedom.

She unfortunately undercuts her argument by employing a strange analogy: The University of Illinois might choose to establish a joint degree program with the University of Edinburgh but not the University of Glasgow, but that would not violate the academic freedom of the professors at the third, unrelated university is much different from American institutions choosing to boycott all Israeli universities. Kapitan is making this comparison in order to differentiate between academic entitlement and academic freedom. Her point is that those who disagree with a blanket boycott of Israeli universities are confusing entitlement with freedom. Indeed, in her hypothetical case, the professors of Glasgow would not have the same academic entitlement should they protest at Illinois’ collaboration with Edinburgh. But this is not the same as a general boycott of Israeli institutions.

Nerdeen Mohsen’s “Standing for Justice: Challenges and Victories of Students for Justice in Palestine” must also be mentioned since it is a contribution that only tangentially deals with the subject of the book: making the case for academic boycott. Instead, Mohsen writes about her childhood in America before going on to make debatable claims and unproven assertions. One such assertion is that Israel is currently carrying out “ethnic cleansing of the Palestinians.” One could indeed make the case that the nature of the occupation, with its ever-expanding settlements, calls into mind aspects of ethnic cleansing, but Mohsen does not make this argument. Rather, she states it as a fact without attempting to substantiate her claim. Assertions without substantiation are, unfortunately, symptomatic of Mohsen’s contribution. Another example is her claim that “the recent hypermilitarization of police in the United States is tied to Israeli occupation policies.” It is this fact is true that various segments of US law enforcement have ties to the Israeli security apparatus, but this does not necessarily imply a simple link between police hypermilitarization in the US and collaboration with Israel.

Toward the end of her contribution, Mohsen writes of how her Students for Justice in Palestine (SJP) chapter at the College of Staten Island (CSI) refused to work with Hillel at CSI even
though the latter group was very keen to collab-
orate. She explains how the CSI Hillel was “eager to
work with us, regardless of our differing politi-
cal stances.” Mohsen and the CSI SJP however, were
not as eager and declined, citing their “political dif-
ferences” and their “stance of antinormalization.”
Unfortunately, Mohsen does not clearly explain the
exact circumstances of the collaboration the CSI
Hillel had in mind. If it were merely a discussion or
debate, for example, it would be unfortunate that “political differences” were an impediment.

Similarly, if “antinormalization” impedes all inter-
actions between two groups of people, how can any meaningful dialogue ever take place? In any case, even though Mohsen claims to have explained her
stance of antinormalization to the vice president
of student affairs (who was also keen to see a SJP-
Hillel collaboration),

Mohsen does not explain “antinormalization”
in her chapter. Instead, she tells us what she told
the CSI vice president of student affairs: that SJP
working with Hillel would be akin to “a climate
change club” working with climate change deniers,
or an LGBTQ group working with a homophobic
organization. Of course, she does not clarify what
working means in these contexts and, especially,
in the non-hypothetical context of Hillel reaching
out to SJP. If, by working together, she means the
holding of some kind of dialogue, then it is regret-
table that no such dialogue did take place due to
ambiguous notions of “political differences” and
“antinormalization.”

While Mohsen’s essay deserves some merit for
highlighting some of the difficulties that SJP chap-
ters at CUNY and other likeminded students face
from the CUNY administration, her case is diluted
by inconsequential paragraphs on her childhood,
unsubstantiated assertions, and a general confusion
over causality and correlation. As an example, she
writes, “the fact that university administrations are
trying so hard to silence us means that we are doing
something right.” This, of course, is not necessarily
so.

While there have been numerous books written
both in favor and against BDS, there had not been,
until recently, books written precisely about the
question of academic boycott of Israeli universities.
In November 2014, Cary Nelson and Gabriel Noah
Brahm edited the essay collection The Case Against
Academic Boycotts of Israel. The following year, in
October 2015, Against Apartheid was published.
Considering the similarity in title, it is likely that
Against Apartheid was conceived as a response to
the former. Unfortunately, remarkably few chap-
ters in Against Apartheid directly address points
made in Nelson and Brahms’ collection.

In general, Against Apartheid reads as a mono-
logue that only briefly attempts to discuss or chal-
lenge opposing views. This is in stark contrast to
Nelson and Brahms’ collection, which devotes at
least 233 pages to discussing and challenging dis-
senting viewpoints. This is only one of the dis-
appointing aspects of Against Apartheid, whose
contributors, as we have seen, occasionally employ
shaky metaphors and unclear terminology, while
demonstrating a hesitancy to avoid the proposed
subject of the collection.

A case in point regarding the confusion over ter-
minology is how Andrew Ross’s “The Wall is Crum-
bling: Will Labor Follow the Universities?” states
that boycotts are tactics and not strategies. Mas-
sad’s piece, on the other hand, claims boycotts are,
in fact, strategies. Neither author however, explains
the difference between strategy and tactic. Never-
theless—and despite failing to convincingly make
the case for a general boycott of Israeli universi-
ties—Against Apartheid has the merit of making a
number of strong points in favor of their argument
that will impact both the debate on academic boy-
cott and the larger debate on BDS.

Adi Saleem Bharat is a PhD student in French at
the Graduate Center, City University of New York.
His research interests include twentieth and twen-
ty-first century French literature, far-right politics
in France, and religious and ethnic minorities in
France.

Endnotes
1. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid:
2. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 6.
3. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 7.
4. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 87.
5. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 113.
6. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 113.
7. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 144.
8. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 144.
9. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
10. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
11. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
12. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
13. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
14. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
15. Mullen, Bill V., and Ashley Dawson, eds., Against Apartheid, 150.
The Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy (JMEPP) is accepting submissions for its print and online publications. JMEPP is a nonpartisan policy review published by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The journal presents a diversity of advanced scholarship on issues of policy relevance to the contemporary Middle East and North Africa. Submissions may discuss trends in politics, economics, development, military affairs, international relations, religion, or culture as they relate to public policy issues within the region.

If you plan to submit, please send an initial abstract of your proposed work to jmepp@hks.harvard.edu.

**Submission Guidelines**

JMEPP is seeking submissions for both its print and online publications.

Appropriate submissions for the print edition include feature articles (1,000–2,500 words), commentaries (500–1,500 words), and book reviews (500–1,500 words).

Appropriate submissions for the online edition will be fewer than 1,000 words and may include commentaries and opinion pieces, news analyses, and art and cultural reviews, as well as other types of analytic or creative content that provide new perspectives on political issues and policy challenges facing the region today.

All submissions must be formatted in Microsoft Word (.doc or .docx) following the Chicago Manual of Style guidelines with citations provided as endnotes. All figures, tables, and charts must be submitted as separate, high-resolution files. Please submit a cover letter with your name, title, and affiliation; mailing address; e-mail address; and daytime phone number. All work must be submitted to jmepp@hks.harvard.edu.

For more information, please visit our website: http://www.hksjmepp.com.